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Foreword 
Jean-Michel Glachant
This booklet shares some of the research carried out by the Florence School of Regulation 
since 2010. 
We have looked at various areas: from smart grids to Schengen-like energy agreements, and 
from incentive regulation to European Gas Target Model.
The relevance of our work (three booklets of that kind circulate) will be better explained by 
qualified introductions:
• Lord Mogg, President of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), Chair of the 
International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER), Chair of the Board of Regulators 
at ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators);
• Fulvio Conti, CEO of Enel and until recently President of Eurelectric, the union of the elec-
tricity industry;
• Daniel Dobbeni, Chairman of the European Network of Transmission System Operators - 
Electricity and President of Eurogrid International, former CEO of Elia.
We did work a lot and did our best. We hope that you will enjoy reading.
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What does energy research bring to 
regulators?
Lord Mogg
1. Energy regulation in Europe is a relatively young profession. Its birth can be traced to 
the mid 1980s when the clear aim was to enhance the economic efficiency of the monopolistic 
gas and electricity industry and so bring benefits to energy consumers. 
2. In the intervening years the challenges faced by energy regulators have become more 
complex and interrelated. Today’s challenges – to name but a few - include meeting the chal-
lenge of climate change, ensuring adequate investment in energy infrastructure in the current 
financial crisis, dealing with the growing pace of political and technological changes which 
increase the uncertainties that energy companies face in knowing where and when to invest, 
increasing market integration, growing consumer involvement in energy markets, and grow-
ing concerns about energy prices.  Regulators today must fulfil objectives which often com-
pete one with another, face increasing demands from consumers and Governments, and must 
operate against the background of less certain information on what the future holds. 
3. It is clear that the regulatory framework of the last ten years will not be adequate to 
meet the challenges regulators face in the next ten. The framework must evolve, and the skills 
of regulators must evolve also. Energy regulators have to keep up with the pace of change and 
to ensure that the regulatory framework and their techniques are fit for today’s tasks. That 
would be a difficult and lonely task, but I am very pleased to say that academic interest in 
energy has grown in recent years. This friendly expert external review of energy regulation 
is an essential check that regulators and policy makers are steering a true path through these 
difficult times.
 4. The Florence School of Regulation is a major centre of excellence in the field of en-
ergy research. Energy research provides regulators with leading edge thinking on the current 
challenges which are central to the work of regulators. This booklet contains recent examples 
of the valuable contribution that FSR continues to make to current challenges that face regula-
tors (and policy makers) in Europe and on behalf of European energy regulators I am grateful 
to all those who have contributed to this work.
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Energy research from an independent research 
institute: What does the industry gain?
Fulvio Conti
The business environment in which the energy industry operates has gone through deep 
transformations and reforms in the last 20 years. Despite the liberalization and deregulation 
of parts of the industry chain, there still is a relevant regulatory oversight of the whole in-
dustry which significantly impacts on income of energy companies, both grid networks and 
market based segments.
The relevance and growing complexity of regulation is demanding - now more than ever - 
for particular consideration by energy companies. All relevant European and global energy 
regulatory dossiers currently under discussion among industry, policy and decision makers 
are deeply intertwined and need to be carefully monitored and analysed for their potential 
impact on the business.
Energy companies should always try challenging their business beliefs by confronting with all 
stakeholders, either business or institution, in independent fora where to meet and debate in 
an open and friendly atmosphere. This kind of interaction allows all involved players to think 
ahead of the evolution of the energy sector and to get a broader strategic view on issues that 
are key to the business and to the community. 
It is vital for a Company like Enel not to lose track of forefront regulatory analysis through 
debates with policy makers, academics and peer Companies. 
Being a donor for the Florence School of Regulation from the outset of its foundation has 
been a real privilege and a necessity for Enel to get a wider and more informed understanding 
of the evolution of the economic and regulatory framework. 
The Florence School of Regulation, born within the broader setting of the European Univer-
sity Institute, is in fact among the most valuable players to exchange views with and to provide 
inputs and insights on next challenges and their possible solutions.
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The distinguished and passionate direction of Jean-Michel Glachant, who also holds the Loy-
ola de Palacio Chair, has brought an innovative and dynamic approach to the school, which is 
now a worldwide benchmark for research in the energy field, providing cutting edge research 
programmes and projects, high level seminars, conferences and other engaging initiatives. 
Among these it’s definitely worth mentioning the school’s renowned training courses, from 
which Enel had the opportunity to lay the grounding for its future results by growing a valu-
able group of young expert regulatory professionals.
With its ever inspiring research activity and strong international orientation, the Florence 
School of Regulation has also been a reference interlocutor of the European Commission and 
has deeply contributed to the European energy regulatory and policy debates. 
The interaction between policy makers, decision makers, the business community and high 
level research centres provides a unique way of looking into the future and contributing to the 
growth of knowledge and to the development of a sound European regulatory framework. In 
this respect, the School has always provided for a valid ground through informal networking 
opportunities with the most prominent international personalities in the field of regulation.
In the quest of an informed and conscious look into the future, companies have the opportu-
nity to rely and lever on the input from such an authoritative and unbiased research institu-
tion. As we see it, the Florence School of Regulation has always proved to be an invaluable 
asset for our Company in particular and for the industry as a whole. 
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What is a smart regulation research for 
regulated companies?
Daniel Dobbeni
A number of key events over the past few years are shifting the world’s geopolitical equilib-
rium, such as the protracted financial and economic crisis, the 2011 earthquake in Japan, 
the industrialisation of shale gas in the United States or the fast growing share of (variable) 
renewable energy sources in Europe. All of them could scarcely have been anticipated before-
hand but will nevertheless shape the energy policies for decades to come.
Amidst this unprecedented turmoil, providing the stable and attractive regulation contem-
plated by investors and operators of generation and network assets turns out to be quite a 
challenge. Gone are the days when long-term energy and environmental policies could be de-
termined without caring too much about their impact on GDP! Restoring Europe’s economy 
and competitiveness so as to re-create jobs are now receiving top priority.
Thereby, uncertainties about security of supply, the rising costs of some energy policies and 
their impact on competitiveness have become daily headlines. Such media attention encour-
ages decision-makers to take short-term decisions designed to resolve national issues. There is 
apparently not enough time (or perhaps not enough trust) to work out a long-term approach 
coordinated at European level.
Against such a background, exchanging ideas and experiences and brainstorming about con-
cepts of smarter regulations are essential. Actually, the traditional cost-plus approach has 
reached its limits. Tomorrow’s regulation shall foster innovation, out-of-the-box thinking, 
more risky approaches for network operators and, last but not least, be attractive to inves-
tors as the challenges facing the power and gas industries are steadily increasing in number, 
complexity and cost. 
As one of the first participants for the Elia Group in the Florence School of Regulation, I 
was able to witness the benefits that could be reaped from bringing together delegates from 
universities, regulatory commissions, generators, grid operators and last but not least Con-
sumers! Seminars, workshops, studies and courses enable those taking part to build up their 
knowledge and expertise about this complex industry while gaining a better understanding of 
the ambitions and constraints of each key part of the value chain.
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I am grateful to my friend Jean-Michel Glachant and all those who have contributed to the 
debates and studies that form the core of this book. The contents illustrate the many tests 
facing energy regulation and industry in the drive to meet one of the greatest challenges of 
the 21st century: a reliable, sustainable and affordable energy supply for everyone in Europe.
Chapter I
Regulation of Infrastructure

Highlights
– The European Union set ambitious objectives for the year 2020 in terms of increase 
of renewable generation, energy savings and reduction of GHG emissions. These 
objectives lead Europe towards a complete decarbonisation of the electricity system
– There is a key role to be played by grids in facilitating the required transformation 
and this implies they need to become “smart”
– In practical terms, making grids smart means deepening the energy system in-
tegration and grid users participation. Grids have to reconfigure notably for the 
integration of distributed generation (DG), the integration of massive large-scale 
renewable (RES), and for the integration of facilitating demand response
– Smarter grids need a smarter regulation. A smart regulation reconfigures the in-
centives and coordination tools of grid companies and grid users and aligns them 
towards the new policy objectives
– Some of the incentives provided to grid companies and grid users by the existing 
regulation must be corrected and some additional mechanisms must be conceived 
and experienced
1. This PB is based on the Working Paper Smart Regulation for Smart Grids by Leonardo Meeus, Marcelo 
Saguan, Jean-Michel Glachant and Ronnie Belmans.
Smart Regulation for Smart Grids1
Authors: Leonardo Meeus, Marcelo Saguan, Jean-Michel Glachant and Ronnie Belmans
Editors: Jean-Michel Glachant and Emanuela Michetti
2010
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Background
The European Union set up ambitious objectives for the year 2020 in terms of increase of re-
newable generation, energy savings and reduction of GHG emissions. Even more ambitious 
objectives are being discussed and developed for 2050. 
These objectives lead Europe towards a complete decarbonisation of the electricity system, a 
high priority in the European context. Decarbonisation requires energy supply, energy con-
sumption as well as the overall electricity system in Europe to undergo a deep and complex 
transformation. 
There is a key role to be played by grids in facilitating the required transformation and this implies 
they need to become “smart”. 
Box 1 - System integration to the purpose of decarbonisation
1. Distributed Generation: medium and small-scale RES (Renewable Energy 
Sources) and CHP (Combined Heat and Power) generation technologies located 
close to the load being served
What does the integration of DG imply?
•	 Efficient grid planning and development
•	 Participation of distributed generators and aggregators to grid planning and development
•	 More flexibility in connection and access services
•	 Participation in ancillary services and wholesale markets
•	 Incorporation of new technologies
2. Demand Response: processes of advanced energy demand management
What does the integration of demand response imply? 
•	 More flexibility of grid services
•	 Bigger use of information to coordinate and optimize grid operations
•	 Incorporation of new technologies (such as smart information services) and communication 
infrastructure
•	 Communication of more information to consumers
•	 Incentives to consumers to use this information
3. Large-scale RES: large-scale renewable generation sets
What does the integration of large-scale RES imply?
•	 Massive grid reinforcements
•	 Dealing with increased coordination and balancing costs
•	 Incorporation of new technologies
•	 Participation to grid planning and development  
11
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What makes grids smart?
In practical terms, making grids smart means deepening the 
energy system integration and grid users participation. Grids 
have to reconfigure notably for the integration of distributed 
generation (DG), the integration of massive large-scale re-
newable (RES), and for the integration of facilitating demand 
response (Box 1). 
The distribution grids till today didn’t have to be so smart 
because they are mainly supposed to “passively” connect 
the load to dedicated power exit points on the transmission 
grid. Distribution grids will then have to deeply reconfigure 
to become smart.  
The transmission grids are already “active” and therefore 
relatively smarter than distribution grids, but they will face 
new challenges both to balance massive intermittent gen-
eration and to evacuate power from remote new areas of 
generation. In order for grids to get enough of the “smart-
ness” required by the new energy policy goals, the regu-
latory framework for grids should also be smartened. A 
smart regulation reconfigures the incentives and coordina-
tion tools of grid companies and grid users and aligns them 
towards the new policy objectives. 
What makes regulations smart? 
The deep process of transformation of the European electric-
ity grids into smart grids is going to be a challenge for grid 
companies and users. There are three main issues: 
A. Costs are likely to increase: The integration of DG, demand response and large scale RES 
should increase certain grid costs, especially system operation costs and service quality costs. 
Furthermore, grid companies will not be willing to make significant new investment (e.g., grid 
reinforcement, voltage control, specific maintenance, or smart meters) without a guaranteed 
adjusted remuneration
B. Revenues are likely to shrink: At the same time, integrating more DG and more demand 
response should reduce the amount of energy to be distributed (or transmitted) trough the grid. 
So that overall several aspects of integration should work against the grid company revenues.
Smart Regulation for 
Smart Grids
WORKING PAPER  
by Leonardo Meeus, Marcelo 
Saguan, Jean-Michel Glachant 
and Ronnie Belmans
Shift, Not Drift: Towards 
Active Demand Response 
and Beyond
THINK TOPIC 11 
From Distribution 
Networks to Smart 
Distribution Systems: 
Rethinking the Regulation 
of European Electricity 
DSOs
THINK TOPIC 12 
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C. Incentives are likely to be lacking: The first two issues with costs and revenues can be dealt 
with by correcting the distortion of incentives in the existing regulatory framework. However 
there is a need for introducing further incentives for both grid companies and grid users. The 
implementation of new incentivising mechanisms (such as “output regulation”) is able to cor-
rect the lack of incentives for certain new output (as “renewable hosting capacity”, “openness 
and robustness of information or control systems”). Output regulation can define some output 
metrics to measure and stimulate the performance of grid companies. 
Box 2 illustrates smart regulations that have already been applied to deal with these issues.
Box 2 - Three case studies
1. Integration of DG: The Orkney Isles 
The case
The Orkney Isles in the north of Scotland are well-known for their attractive RES potential. At the 
same time, they represent a typical rural distribution setting with very low demand, relatively weak 
distribution grid and very limited connection capacity with the transmission grid.
In order to improve the grid hosting capacity without upgrading the connection with the main-
land, the distribution company is implementing an innovative solution. The so-called Active Net-
work Management (ANM) controls electricity output of new generators to match the available 
capacity of the network in real time. Thanks to this innovative solution, 21 MW of additional DG 
can be connected to the grid. 
Which regulatory tools were implemented?
The Orkney distribution company has benefited from two UK innovation funding mechanisms: 
IFI (Innovation Funding Incentive) - covering R&D costs - and RPZ (Registered Power Zone) – 
rewarding R&D outputs, which in this case of Orkney Isles is the connection of new DG via the 
ANM innovation.
Main lessons learned
A smart regulation, based on incentives and output regulation as well as on ad hoc funding mecha-
nisms, could provide the right incentives to the innovation of the grid technology.
  
2. Integration of demand response: Italy
The case
Italy is well-known to be a frontrunner in smart metering: it has the largest smart metering system 
in the world, with 90% of low voltage customers having such a meter. 
A recent Government Decree establishes that distribution companies should also install a visual 
display for electricity and energy customers. The so-called “Smart Info” device is an innovative 
solution considered by Enel Distribuzione to comply with this new legislation. The device has a 
USB connection and can make the meter accessible from any plug in a house. This device would 
not only allow distribution companies to comply with the new legislation concerning the visual 
display, but also improve third party access to smart metering, since third parties might develop 
new services via the USB connection.  
13
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Which regulatory tools were implemented?
Electricity distribution in Italy is regulated through a price cap tariffs system reviewed every 4 
years. Price cap regulation provides incentives to distribution grids to reduce operational costs 
and smart meters can indeed help reducing costs in many ways (e.g., logistic costs, field operations 
costs, customer services costs). The regulation of electricity distribution activities in Italy also in-
cludes service quality regulation, therefore companies have incentives to improve service quality 
and use smart meters to record the quality of supply.
Starting from 2004, metering activities have been subjected to a specific and separated tariffs regu-
lation with stronger incentives to cut costs and get efficiency gains.
Moreover, the Italian Energy Authority has recently issued a competitive procedure to incentivise 
active grid projects that can be supplemented with experimental demand response schemes. The 
selected project will be allowed an extra WACC (+2%) for a period of 12 years. Finally, user par-
ticipation on the demand side in Italy has also been incentivised through white certificates and 
ToU (Time-of-Use) prices. 
Main lessons learned
Several regulatory tools have been implemented to promote user participation on the demand side. 
More positive outcomes will be fully achieved with the improvement of the access to smart meters. 
3. Integration of a large-scale off-shore park: The Kriegers Flak area
The case
The Kriegers Flak area in the Baltic Sea was recognised a potential generation capacity of 1600 
MW to be developed through offshore wind plants across the three regions included in the Dan-
ish, German and Swedish territories. The three correspondent TSOs are considering an innovative 
combined solution to connect the wind farms to their transmission grids, instead of separate solu-
tions. The big advantages associated to a combined solution would be at least two. First, the pool-
ing of the connection capacity means that the energy produced by one wind farm can escape via 
the connection of another wind farm in case there are problems with its connection. Second, the 
pooling allows the capacity that is not used by the wind farms to be used to transfer energy from a 
low price zone to a high price zone. This would guarantee a more efficient and more reliable use of 
the connections for the wind farms as well as the promotion of market integration.
The innovative solution (multi-terminal High Voltage Direct Current Voltage Source Converter 
system, HVDC VSC) would be the first large scale implementation of this kind. This technology 
is considered to be exactly what Europe needs to realize its vision of a super trans-national grid to 
unlock the large scale RES potentials. 
Which regulatory tools were implemented?
The integration case of the Kriegers Flak area clearly requires a very high level of coordination 
among the three TSOs. A feasibility study published in a joint report shows that the combined so-
lution generates net benefits relative to the separate solution. Nevertheless, the current regulation 
in force is not incentivising coordination. TSOs are subject to regulations that are mainly national 
in scope and they have no incentive to enable the integration of large scale offshore wind or to 
increase the interconnection capabilities with neighbouring countries.
14
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Moreover, the specific regulation for the connection of renewable plants can be quite different in 
the three countries. For instance, the German TSOs must connect all renewable plants (regard-
less of their capacity) and undertake the due investments to reinforce the grid. As opposed to 
Sweden, where the plant owner is in charge of the connection from the off shore wind park to 
the online grid.
As a result, a separated solution is currently being established for the first wind park that will be 
connected in Germany, before the combined solution can be ready. Meanwhile, the Swedish wind 
park has been postponed and the Danish wind park has been reduced from 400 MW to 300 MW.
Main lessons learned
The implementation of an international cooperative solution is affected by the lack of deep coordina-
tion among TSOs and regulators. The regulation of wind farms development and grid expansion are 
too different regarding support schemes, connection costs, technology choices, and investment sched-
uling and balancing rules. Massive European renewable penetration will not succeed if countries do 
not duly cooperate.
Recommendations
Making grid smarter is absolutely not an objective in itself. Making grid smarter is mainly a 
fundamental step towards the achievement of the European policy objective of decarbonisation 
of the electricity system. It targets higher energy efficiency and a more responsive demand; a 
higher proportion of distributed generation and a massive penetration of renewable. Grids will 
however only be smart if grid companies develop the corresponding new services based on cer-
tain grid technology innovations. It will work only if grid users participate in this ongoing grid 
innovation, adopt the complementary technologies and use the services that will be derived 
from the grid technology innovation.
Smarter grids need a smarter regulation. Some of the incentives provided to grid companies 
and grid users by the existing regulation must be corrected and some additional mechanisms 
must be conceived and experienced (Box 3). 
15
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Box 3 - Regulation gets smarter when it… 
Recognises the new grid service requirements and their respective costs
Includes these service outputs in the revenue drives of grid companies by defining and measur-
ing new services
Allows grid users to participate at this definition so that they can value the services they ask for
Addresses grid technology innovation separately
Extends output regulation over several regulatory periods
Establishes specific additional incentivising regulatory mechanisms to ensure the transition 
from R&D to value for money grid services
Identifies and ranks the beneficiaries of the technology innovation
Provides for public money to contribute to ensure the electric system transformation process
Considers the regulatory framework as a whole and identifies the existing regulation which may 
possibly work against grid innovation
Experiments and ensures that learning loops will take place

Highlights
 – In order to foster infrastructure investment, National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) may exempt privately funded electricity interconnectors from one or 
more of the following: (i) regulated third party access (TPA), (ii) restrictions 
on the use of congestion revenues, (iii) tariff regulation and (iv) ownership un-
bundling.
 – National exemption decisions are reviewed by the European Commission (EC) 
when interconnectors touch two or more Member States. So far, four so-called 
“merchant” projects have reached the EC (all were approved): EstLink (2005), 
BritNed (2007), Imera/East-West Cables (2008) and Arnoldstein-Tarvisio 
(2010). 
 – Without explanation, the EC has been gradually tightening the reins on the 
exemption regime since first approving an exemption in 2005. Yet analysis of 
these cases reveals an implicit set of preferences narrowly tailored to enable the 
development of a high-risk project without unduly advantaging its sponsor. 
 – By analysing the existing EU exemption cases, this policy brief aims to uncover 
the EC’s implicit preferences with regards to exemptions from the regulatory 
provisions governing cross-border interconnector development and operation.
EU Electricity Interconnector 
Policy: Shedding Some Light on the 
European Commission’s Approach to 
Exemptions
Authors: Michael Cuomo and Jean-Michel Glachant
2012
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Background
The Electricity Directive generally promotes electricity 
interconnector investment on a fully regulated basis by a 
transmission system operator (TSO) in order to “ensur[e] 
the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable de-
mands for the transmission of electricity.”1 As an exception, 
exemptions from the regulatory framework are available 
in cases where an interconnector’s risk level is “such that 
the investment would not take place unless the exemption 
is granted.”2 The primary risks affecting interconnector 
investments are non-use and future change in costs and/
or revenues, e.g. revenues would be negatively affected by 
volume or price fluctuations or future changes to conges-
tion management rules.3 Exemptions give project owners 
greater control over cash flow, which increases business opportunity when determining an 
investment’s payback period. A full exemption provides maximum control, by making in-
applicable regulated TPA, restrictions on the use of congestion revenues, regulation of tar-
iffs and since 3 March 2011 ownership unbundling; however, such independence from the 
regulatory framework may be detrimental to competition. For example, where an exemp-
tion from regulated TPA enables a dominant undertaking in one of the linked markets “ to 
consolidate its position or otherwise foreclose the market.”4 Thus, partial exemptions (i.e. 
exemptions covering only a portion of total capacity or, for example, applying to third party 
access but not tariff regulation) may be granted to projects whose business risk level does 
not justify the potential risk to competition of a full exemption.5 
Eligibility for an exemption
The existing EU regulatory framework promotes electricity interconnector investment 
within a regulated access regime as part of a Member State’s regulated asset base (“RAB”). 
Exemptions are intended to enable investment only in those projects deemed too risky to be 
developed as part of the RAB. To determine eligibility for an exemption, a project must pass 
a six-part risk and competition analysis outlined in Article 17(1) of the Electricity Regula-
1. Article 12(a) of the Electricity Directive and section 1.1 of Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)642.
2. Article 7(1)(b) of the Electricity Regulation.
3. Section 1.3(10) of Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)642.
4. See section 35 of the Exemption decision on the East-West-Cable Project, dated 19 December 2008 (the 
“Imera Exemption Decision”).
5. “Exemptions must be limited to what is strictly necessary to realize the investment and the scope of the 
exemption has to be proportionate.” Section 1.3(17) of Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)642.
Debate on Exemptions 
at FSR
WORKSHOP on TPA and 
Unbundling Exemptions: 
What Role Should They 
Play in Promoting an Inte-
grated Energy?
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tion (the “Threshold Test”). This determination is made by each NRA on a case-by-case 
basis and, ultimately, approved or rejected by the EC in cases where interconnectors involve 
more than one Member State. A successful applicant is eligible for an exemption from one or 
more of the following (i) regulated TPA, (ii) restrictions on the use of congestion revenues, 
(iii) tariff regulation and (iv) ownership unbundling.
What is the Role of the EC in the Exemption Decision Process?
Exemptions granted by NRAs are subject to EC review where projects involve two or more 
Member States. Such practice shall “ensure a consistent application of the exemption prac-
tice and safeguard the wider European interest.”7 The EC may approve, reject or modify a 
national exemption decision in the final stages of the exemption request process, making the 
process itself a significant risk for investors. These late stage conditions are not yet predict-
able, and, thus, represent a risk for merchant projects that typically incur several years of 
planning costs before submitting an exemption request. Aggravating this situation, the EC’s 
actual criteria in making a decision are not yet fully revealed, appearing only implicitly in 
the exemption decisions. 
The Cases So Far
EstLink (2005). Estlink is a submarine 350 MW HVDC twin-cable interconnector con-
structed to link the electricity transmission grids of Estonia and Finland. On 27 April 2005, 
the EC confirmed the national level exemption from regulated third party access, restric-
tions on the use of congestion revenues and tariff regulation until 31 December 2013. On or 
before that date, Estlink will be transferred to Fingrid Oy and the TSOs in the Baltic States.
The EC did not request any modification to the NRA decision.
6.This initial two-month period is subject to extension where the EC requests additional information or by 
consent of the relevant parties
7. Note 4, at section 12.
Box 1 - The current exemption request procedure
1. Submit Request. Applicant submits a “request for exemption” to the NRAs
2. National Decision(s). Since the establishment of ACER, the NRAs must inform 
ACER of their decision within six months. If the NRAs do not reach a decision, 
ACER may decide on their behalf
3. EC Review. Within two months after being notified (?) of a national-decision, the 
EC will either approve the exemption or request that the NRAs modify or withdraw 
their decision6
20
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BritNed (2007).  BritNed is a submarine 1000 MW HVDC 
cable constructed to link the electricity transmission grids 
of Great Britain and the Netherlands. On 18 October 2007, 
the EC approved a twenty-five year exemption. However, 
due to its concern that BritNed may have undersized the 
capacity of the interconnector in order to artificially in-
flate congestion revenues, the EC requested that the NRAs 
amend their exemption decisions with the addition of a fi-
nancial review after ten years of operation. At such time, 
BritNed must present the NRAs with a report of total costs, 
total revenues and the rate of return using 2007 as a base 
year.8 If the actual ex post revenue estimate is more than 
one percentage point greater than the estimate contained 
in BritNed’s exemption request, BritNed will be given two 
options: (a) increase capacity – this additional capacity will 
not be covered automatically by the original exemption; or 
(b) cap any profits (discounted to 2007 levels) that exceed 
BritNed’s estimated rate of return by more than one per-
centage point and surrender such excess to be used to fi-
nance the RAB in the UK and the Netherlands.9
Imera/East-West Cables (2008).  Imera is a submarine 700 
MW HVDC dual-cable interconnector that was anticipated 
to link the grids of Ireland and Great Britain. On 19 De-
cember 2008, the EC approved a twenty-five year exemp-
tion from regulated third party access, restrictions on the 
use of congestion revenues and tariff regulation. In its analysis, the EC concluded that Imera 
satisfied the risk threshold only because of the “significantly higher economic risk” created 
by the planned development of a competing, fully regulated interconnector (EirGrid).10 The 
completion of EirGrid and the actual availability of its capacity were the principal conditions 
to approval.11 Other conditions included: a 40% capacity cap for any dominant undertaking 
in either system or market to which the interconnector is connected; effective congestion 
management pursuant to the Congestion Management Guidelines, including intra-day trad-
ing; and, assessment by CER and Ofgem of the effectiveness of Imera’s facilitated secondary 
trading and UIOLI procedures.12 
8. Section 13(a) of the BritNed Exemption Decision by the European Commission, dated 18 October 2007.
9. Supra at subsections 13(b)(i) and (b)(ii).
10. Section 25 of the Imera Exemption Decision.
11. Id. at sections 27 and 55.
12. Id. at section 56.
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Arnoldstein-Tarvisio (2010). Arnoldstein-Tarvisio is an overland Austria to Italy AC inter-
connector with a nominal voltage of 132kV and a maximum capacity of 160 MVA. On 26 
October 2010, the EC issued a decision approving the exemption but requesting that the 
50% exemption from regulated TPA granted by the NRAs should be withdrawn altogether 
so that 100% of capacity is available for auction. Rejecting the applicant’s argument that re-
serving capacity was necessary to recover its investment, the EC reasoned that since the con-
gestion management guidelines require unused capacity to be sold on the secondary mar-
ket, reserving capacity was not necessary to recovering the investment. Auctioning 100% of 
Box 2 
(a) Three Conditions for an Approval of an Exemption
The interconnector must enhance 
competition
A general competition analysis is conducted – the inter-
connector must show a positive effect on competition. 
The risk level must necessitate an 
exemption
The risks must rise to a level that rules out development 
of the interconnector as a regulated investment.
Granting an exemption must leave 
competition unharmed
Focus is on whether exempting the project from regula-
tion would harm competition conditions.
(b) The EC’s Analysis of the Four Cases
EstLink BritNed Imera Arnoldstein -Tarvisio
Would the 
interconnector 
enhance 
competition?
YES YES YES YES
Does risk level 
necessitate an 
exemption?
YES YES YES YES
Would exemption 
leave competition 
unharmed?
YES MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE
(c) Consequences of a “Maybe” by the EC
Additional 
Conditions 
Imposed à
Review of  
Revenues 
(de facto cap)
Cap on Capac-
ity share held by 
any single party
Congestion 
Management 
Requirements 
Withdraw  
Exemption
BritNed X
Imera X X
Arnoldstein-
Tarvisio X
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capacity should be equally as effective.13 In addition, any 
further exemption for significant capacity increases must 
be approved by the EC; and, the exemption will expire if the 
interconnector is not operational within five years.14
Shedding Some Light on the EC’s Reasoning
The analysis of the existing cases reveals an implicit set of 
preferences on the EC’s side as an exemption can touch 
one or more of TPA, congestion revenues, tariffs and un-
bundling to differing degrees (from full exemption to very 
partial or very temporary exemption). To shed some light 
on the EC’s reasoning, we use a three-point approach con-
sisting of the three conditions raised most often in the EC’s 
decisions (see Box 2). 
Out of four cases, only one (EstLink) was approved without 
the imposition of additional conditions. As Box 2(c) shows, 
the EC imposed conditions on the other three merchant interconnectors based solely on 
the third point of analysis: “whether exempting a project from certain aspects of regulation 
would harm competition.” In other words, it was the sanctioned departure from the regula-
tory framework, not the proposed interconnector itself that the EC deemed problematic. 
A “Maybe” led, in all cases, to the imposition of additional conditions intended to ensure 
conformity with the exemption criteria, e.g. the review of revenues imposed on BritNed was 
intended to counterbalance the risk that BritNed intentionally undersized capacity in order 
to boost revenues from artificially created congestion.15
Conclusion
Since approving the first exemption in 2005, the EC has been gradually tightening the reins 
on the exemption regime: the EstLink exemption was approved by the EC without condi-
tion, while the latest decision, Arnoldstein-Tarvisio, requested the complete withdrawal of 
a national level TPA exemption. In the absence of explicit evidence, it is not clear whether 
the EC’s increased stringency represents an intentional shift in attitude towards the exemp-
tion regime (and/or divergence in the EC’s standards and those of national regulators). It is 
clear, however, that the spectre of additional conditions in the final stage of the exemption 
approval process has a de facto chilling effect on merchant investment. At a time when ad-
ditional interconnection capacity is crucial to the achievement of the single energy market 
in 2014, the EC might consider loosening its grip?
13. Sections 22-27 of the Arnoldstein-Tarvisio Exemption Decision, dated 26/10/2010.
14. Id. at sections 35-41.
15. Note 4, at Box 7.
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Highlights
 – Several regulatory regimes have been conceived to incentivize network operators 
to provide services in an efficient manner and to pull them in a continuous process 
of revelation of the economics of their tasks’ operation. 
 – Major challenges are arising today for the electricity system (such as: network 
quality concerns, various grid innovations, or climate change policy). The classical 
“cost killing” goals of incentive regulation are then challenged with new goals. The 
regulators must find how to optimally match their existing regulatory tools with 
these renewed goals while taking into account more of the actual specificities of 
the network operation.
 – The economic literature built the existing regulatory tools we have today by assum-
ing that a regulator behaves like a theoretical actor, having all the ideally desired 
cognitive and computational capabilities. The reality, however, is that the regula-
tors are endowed with only limited and heterogeneous resources.
 – Theory frequently assumed that a regulator uses a single type of regulatory tool to 
give incentives to a network company performing a single type of tasks. In real life, 
the regulators are facing companies performing multiple types of tasks and have to 
use several types of regulatory tools to deal with these different tasks.
 – Regulatory tools should then be assessed to properly match with the real charac-
teristics of the network operator’s tasks. We assume that the key characteristics for 
an operationalization of this “regulatory alignment” are: the controllability, pre-
dictability and observability of the tasks, the costs and the output. However these 
regulatory characteristics have to be aligned as well with the requirements of the 
various regulatory tools in terms of regulator’s resources and capabilities. 
1. This PB is based on the Working Paper Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment 
with Resource Bounded Regulators by Jean-Michel Glachant, Haikel Khalfallah, Yannick Perez, Vincent 
Rious and Marcelo Saguan. 
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Background
Electricity network regulation has been conceived to ensure that network services are produced 
at minimum costs for a given quality of service. Due to asymmetrical information between the 
regulator and the network operator, several regulatory regimes have been conceived to incen-
tivize companies to provide their services in an efficient manner and to push / pull them in a 
process of revealing their private information on the economics of their tasks operation (Box 1).
Major changes have recently occurred with electricity systems: new network quality concerns 
have appeared, climate change policy is now a key driver of the EU energy policy and grid 
growing innovation is becoming a concern. Regulation should then reconsider what are the 
right incentives to undertake all this. The classical cost-killing goal of “RPI-x” has to adapt 
to new goals of regulation. The regulators have to find how to optimally match all workable 
regulatory tools with today’s relevant goals as well as with the actual economic characteristics 
of network operators’ tasks. 
The economic literature built most of the existing regulatory tools by assuming that the regula-
tor is an agent having all the desired cognitive and computational abilities to properly deal with 
information asymmetry. The reality, however, is that regulators are endowed with only limited 
and heterogeneous resources. Furthermore the regulator is supposed to control the network 
operators’ costs as a whole while they actually are the byproducts of different tasks with differ-
ent economic characteristics. Today, the right regulatory question should then be: how to align 
the regulatory tools, the regulator capabilities and the targeted network tasks to deliver a set of 
efficient outcomes?   
Box 1: Theoretical regulatory tools
•	 Cost plus: The simpler regulation of electricity networks has had to focus on con-
trolling the costs of services provided by the regulated firms. This was based on the 
principle of compensating the regulated firms up to their costs. In this regulatory 
frame the regulator observes and audits, each year generally, the firms’ operating and 
investment costs and sets the allowed revenue for that (or the next) year. This revenue 
includes a reward in the form of a rate-of-return compensating the firms’ capital as-
sets. In very general terms, with this regime, the regulated firms keep the benefit from 
their informational advantage. Rather, they are not incited to reveal more than their 
observable costs from their own set of economic information.
•	 Price/Revenue Cap: Contrarily to cost plus regulation, price cap regulation implies 
that the regulator unilaterally sets a maximum allowed revenue (or a price per unit of 
output) that the firm can get for the services provided in a conventional period –four 
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to five years- so as to be partially but not totally linked to its incurred costs. As the length 
of the regulatory period is relatively longer than with cost plus regulation, the incurred 
costs could happen to be lower than the earned revenue. This allows the firm to benefit 
from its cost cutting. This regulatory scheme provides simple and clear incentives for 
cost reduction which would increase the social welfare (with less costs for the same 
output) in an environment based on asymmetric information. This does not mean that 
the asymmetrical information problem is easily solved. Notably in cases where there is 
a too important lack of regulator expertise to properly anticipate and predict the future 
firm’s costs, firms might earn excessive rents within that regulatory period. However, 
only very dramatic regulator mistakes could end reducing the social welfare.
•	 Menu of Contracts: Cost plus and price cap regulations are, in theory, the two ex-
treme cases in terms of gain and risk sharing. The menu of contract scheme lies in 
between these two extremes. The price that the regulated firm will receive is linked 
ex ante to its realized costs observed ex post as well as to a reference cost determined 
ex ante. The regulator then offers a set of benefits / costs sharing contracts and the 
firm chooses the more suitable one regarding its privately projected expenditures, its 
efficiency capability belief and its own risk aversion. Such contract mechanism would 
open higher productive and allocative efficiency objectives. On the one hand it is 
conceived to provide incentives to perform much better by giving the firm the op-
portunity to benefit from its own knowledge of feasible cost saving and better serving. 
On the other hand, it ensures that prices have to follow an underlying cost variation 
within a reasonable distance. 
•	 Performance-based Regulation: Menu of contracts is a general category which cov-
ers PBR (Performance Based Regulation). PBR has been used to better target a par-
ticular task with its own particular incentive schemes (like: cost of losses; cost of 
reserves; cost of congestions; etc.). It gives a direct link between the ex post observed 
performance and an ex ante defined set of financial reward and penalty. Ex ante the 
regulator has set a specific formula that links a financial reward-penalty scheme to a 
firm’s expected tasks expressed in an agreed KPI (“Key Performance Indicator”). 
•	 Yardstick (Benchmarking): It is a way to set performances or prices of a given com-
pany on the basis of the outcomes of other similar companies. In its full form, each 
benchmarked company has no control over its own revenues. Its allowed revenues are 
only linked to an index of the other suppliers’ performances. A second and relaxed 
approach relies on external performances for only one part of the firm’s revenues. It 
usually covers the calculation of a productivity trend factor or an initial price in a 
price cap scheme. It may also be the ex ante targeting of a task performance in the 
performance-based regulation.
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Discrepancy between the practice of regulation and the textbook model 
of a regulator
In the textbook model, the regulator is assumed to have sufficient cognitive, computational and 
administrative abilities to implement a regulatory regime decreasing the information asym-
metry and dealing efficiently with the risk and uncertainty in the regulatory environment. 
However in reality, most regulators have severely limited resources (power, budget and skills) 
to efficiently implement all the conceivable regulatory tools. 
Regulators’ actual capabilities depend primarily on their 
current resources and accumulated experiences which may 
strongly deviate from what the textbook model assumes. 
Furthermore regulators behave according to countries’ po-
litical and judicial profiles which influence their willingness 
to undertake risky decisions. Regulators may have to be con-
servative to avoid negative judicial reviews (like in the USA). 
They may also be small administrative units of 10-20 people 
unable to enter into uncertain and complex regulatory in-
novation. On the contrary, the UK’s regulator has been an 
atypical case of a rather rich, free and sometimes risk taking 
regulator able to invest in innovative regulatory regimes, to 
adapt to the changing energy scene, and to look after dynamic efficiency going beyond the al-
ready acclaimed cost killing objectives. A regulator with resources and power may undertake 
uncertain changes and face a risk of error. 
Besides this, textbook regulation generally assumed that the regulator addresses a company 
performing a unique task with a single regulatory tool. In practice however, the regulator is fac-
ing a company performing various types of tasks and may have to apply various regulatory tools 
to these different tasks. Any applied economic reasoning should now reevaluate the regulatory 
tools in a renewed rational choice frame.  
Characteristics of the network operator’s tasks
Beside the discrepancy between the reality of regulators’ abilities and the assumption of the 
textbook model, it is also usually assumed that the regulator frames a company performing a 
single task with a single regulatory tool. In practice, network operators perform various types 
of tasks with different characteristics. For transmission, the main tasks may be seen as various 
as: 1- system operation, 2- grid maintenance, 3- network user connection, 4- customer relation-
ship management and 5- grid expansion. TSOs may also face new tasks arising from the new 
regulatory objectives, like a revival of RD&D in both domains of infrastructure and services. 
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Controlling the network operator’s costs and service quality as a whole would then be ineffi-
cient given the heterogeneous nature of its tasks. Encouraging companies to reduce operational 
expenditures could lead to a lower quality of this or that provided service. Another drawback 
arises with innovation which is inevitably costly in the short term with an expected benefit only 
obtained in a longer period while exposing the company to a higher risk. That is why, first, the 
regulator should strike a proper balance between medium term novelties and short term cost 
efficiency by assessing the firm’s financial sustainability in the long run. Second, the regulator 
may have to conceive a hybrid approach that combines various kinds of regulatory tools to bet-
ter address the various characteristics of the different tasks. 
The key regulatory characteristics of the various network tasks belong to three categories: Con-
trollability, Predictability (ex ante) and Observability (ex post) (Box 2).  
Box 2: Regulatory characteristics of network operator’s tasks
Controllability: It qualifies the network operator’s ability to manage a single cost/task or 
a combination of several as to get a defined level and quality of output. 
Predictability: It qualifies the possibility of predicting (then: ex ante) the influence of 
external factors on network costs/tasks and the relationship between a given set of costs/
tasks and the level and quality of outputs.
Observability: It qualifies the possibility of verifying (then: ex post) the influence of exter-
nal factors on network costs/tasks and the relationship between a given set of costs/tasks 
and the level and quality of outputs.
The regulatory alignment between network tasks, regulatory tools and 
regulator’s abilities
The first criterion to look at when wanting to match a network task and a regulatory tool is the 
controllability of the task by the network operator. When the network operator is unable to 
significantly influence the cost or the outcome of a task, the economics of the output are mainly 
out of the company’s control. It will not make much sense to regulate such a task with an incen-
tive scheme. This will be better addressed via a cost plus scheme. To get the maximum benefits 
of that scheme the regulator should then have minimum accounting capabilities as to audit the 
company’s uncontrollable costs and to set a tariff for them (for instance, in a meshed grid used 
for high transit from abroad the operator cannot easily control its aggregated volume of losses).
When network tasks are controllable, the TSO can undertake actions to reach an efficient level 
of operation, and an incentive regulatory scheme makes sense (for instance, congestion costs 
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being controllable in the medium term -while not easily in the short term- and volume of losses 
in an isolated power system where the TSO is actually able to act on these levels). 
In practice, however, the choice of the appropriate regulatory tool will then depend on the (ex 
ante) predictability of the task operation, and the regulator’s own capability to manage more 
complex and more hazardous decision processes to influence the targeted efficient outcome. 
However, when the task’s outcomes are too difficult to 
predict (by the company or by the regulator), a cost 
plus scheme could always be applied as a “safe plan B”. 
It can also be the case with unfamiliar innovation undertaking. 
Inversely, a regulator might conceive more complex incentive 
schemes whose risks depend on the degree of task predictabil-
ity, given that a low predictability should imply a higher risk 
and vice versa. The degree of task predictability is also linked to 
the regulator’s proper capabilities. A regulator with a large sen-
ior and experienced team plus a large consultancy budget can 
better tackle the hazards of complex schemes than a regulator 
with a limited junior staff and a starvation budget. 
Finally, the last step in a regulatory tool choice comes with the 
task / cost’s (ex post) observability. Observability may be too 
low or the regulator may think that its very limited resources 
will not allow it to collect relevant enough information on the 
actual management of the tasks having been performed. Here again the regulator may prefer the 
safeguard of a cost plus scheme.  
On the contrary, in case of a limited observability of certain tasks for a rich and experienced regula-
tor, it makes sense for it to invest in more advanced regulatory tools as a “menu of contracts” where 
the company is pulled into a voluntary efficiency revelation scheme. When the menu of contracts is 
conceived correctly enough, the company will rationaly choose a contract that fits best with its true 
(while unobservable) task characteristics. Another sophisticated way to address this information 
problem is to apply benchmarking techniques, creating a “virtual competition environment” upon 
the condition that the regulator could get enough relevant information from several comparable 
network operators. It also assumes that the regulator has enough cognitive and computational capa-
bilities as to manage the demanding process of benchmarking results interpretation.
Of course with a high observability of tasks, a regulator may choose less sophisticated tools requir-
ing lower experience and resources. We must however distinguish two types of observable tasks. 
When the observable task is an input into the firm’s activity process and is required to provide a 
well-defined output, a price cap regulation might be appropriate. Under this regime, the network 
Learn more on grid 
tarification
EU Involvement in Elec-
tricity and Natural Gas 
Transmission Grid Tarifi-
cation
THINK Report  
by Sophia Ruester, Christian 
von Hirschhausen, Claudio 
Marcantonini, Xian He, 
Jonas Egerer and Jean-Michel 
Glachant
29
FLORENCE  SCHOOL OF REGULATION
operator could undertake efficient actions to reduce the cost / increase the output of the task and 
to benefit from this improvment (for instance, transmission maintenance tasks are controllable, 
predictable and observable. Assuming that the regulator could easily observe the past firm’s perfor-
mances, a price cap regulation with a defined efficiency target should be sufficient). 
However the output may have two separated dimensions: the quantity (the volume) and the qual-
ity (the unitary utility for the consumer) of the provided service. When both are observable and 
the regulator is also able to properly define (ex ante) and measure (ex post) the quality of service, a 
“performance-based” regulation of the output would be more appropriate than a price cap. When 
quality is controllable in the medium term it is because the network operator knows how to influ-
ence it by her investment and maintenance decisions. Quality may also be predictable if extreme 
events are filtered out from the quality indicators. Quality may then be observable to some extents, 
depending on the set of indicators that the regulator is able to conceive and to use. With an out-
put regulation for quality, the regulator sets the output targets that the network operator should 
meet within a predefined period as well as certain economic schemes reacting to the observed 
deviations. Any gap vis-a-vis the ex ante target will be treated in a predefined penalty or a reward 
function.   
Cost +
Menu
Yardstick
Price cap
Output 
regulation
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
High output observability
Controllability?
Predictability?
Observability?
Regulator’s
abilities
Figure 1: A Regulatory Alignment Decision Tree
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We now look at tasks closely linked to an innovation process. 
An innovation process may be controllable in the sense that 
the network operator may significantly influence the output of 
innovation that it will produce. However innovation has a low 
degree of predictability and observability. Nevertheless this predictability and observability also 
increases with the technological and managerial maturity of the innovation process. In case of low 
maturity, it seems inappropriate to put in place an incentive regulation tool because of the difficulty 
for both the regulator and the network operator to predict innovation’s costs and benefits, whatever 
the actual degree of regulator abilities. In case of higher maturity, however, an incentive regulation 
that sets a rule of risk sharing between the network operator and the grid users may usefully be 
considered. A scheme is to pay innovation by unit of outcome measured by some KPI. Again, the 
degree of observability of the innovation process depends significantly on the innovation maturity. 
Figure 1 summarizes the “regulatory alignment” decision tree to identify the appropriate regu-
latory tool assuming certain regulator’s capabilities, the network operator’s nature of tasks and 
the implementable regulatory tools. To sum up: If a particular task does not satisfy any of the 
controllability, predictability and observability criteria, then the cost plus scheme is the most 
likely tool to recover the incurred cost. Otherwise, the usefulness of any other appropriate regu-
latory tool would mainly depend on the actual regulator endowment.    
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Highlights
 – European electricity TSOs will have to achieve substantial capital expenditures 
over the next two decades. Their current financing strategy will not be adapted 
to these unprecedented costs. Even in a ‘best-case’ scenario of full cooperation 
between the different national and regional TSOs, it will result in constraints on 
the volume of investment achievable. 
 – Under current trends in the evolution of transmission tariffs, the investment 
programs that are currently planned will be unsustainable in the long-term. To 
avoid severe degradation of the TSOs financial profile, a significant increase in 
tariffs will be required. 
 – Alternative financing strategies, such as issuing additional equity, or restraining 
dividends, could help achieving the whole-scale investment volumes at a lower 
cost for consumers. However these financing strategies cannot substitute fully 
to an increase in tariffs. A very radical shift in the financing strategy would only 
allow a slightly higher share of the investment plans to be financed, at the ex-
pense of a reduced return-on-equity. Injecting capital in the transmission busi-
ness would not remain attractive under such conditions. 
1. This PB is based on the Working Paper Financing Investment in the European Electricity Transmis-
sion Network: Consequences on Long-Term Sustainability of the TSOs Financial Structure by Arthur 
Henriot.
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Background: The financeability challenge
The need for investment in the European transmission grid
The European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) will face unprecedented capital ex-
penditures over the next decades. This need for investment has two main drivers. On the 
one hand, the development of the European electricity transmission grid is to play a key-role 
in the strategy of the European Union, to address challenges such as the accommodation of 
large-scale renewable sources of energy and market integration. On the other hand, a major 
share of the existing network is to be renewed in the coming decades.  
The resulting volumes of investment will be challenging for TSOs. The ten-year plan estab-
lished in 2012 by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for electricity 
(ENTSO-E) for instance mentions investments of €104 billion to be spent in the next ten 
years for projects of pan-European significance alone. Even with plans by European TSOs 
to raise their investments by approximately 70% compared to the period 2005-2009, there 
would still be a significant financing gap to be met. 
TSOs financing strategies: Options and limits
Financeability hereby refers to the ability of TSOs to raise finance from capital markets in 
order to meet their investment program. It implies that the TSOs conserve adequate finan-
cial ratios, corresponding to an investment grade status for rating agencies (See Box 1 for a 
description of the ratios we took into consideration in this study). In addition, the return on 
the regulatory asset base must be sufficient to cover the costs of capital of investors. 
There are three basic ways in which TSOs can finance capital expenditures: investors can 
raise debt, fund investment internally by retaining earnings, or find external sources of eq-
uity.
Since liberalisation, debt emission has been the option most commonly employed by inte-
grated utilities in general and European TSOs in particular. As a result, the volume of debt 
has kept rising, and the leverage of European electricity TSOs is typically about 60-70% 
today, which limits the ability of these companies to acquire further debt without losing 
their credit rating. 
Internal equity is a major source of financing for some small European TSOs, but it can-
not be sufficient alone at times when the investment needs increase significantly. Moreover, 
investors in TSOs traditionally expect a high dividend pay-out ratio, which limits the ability 
of TSOs to finance investments internally. 
Raising external equity is an attractive option when the debt level has to be kept under a 
given threshold. Yet it is also a more expensive option. In addition to higher costs, there are 
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two main obstacles to financing investments by injecting external equity, due to the fact that 
most European TSOs are still publicly owned2 . Cash-strapped European States are not able 
to inject liquidities themselves, and States might also be reluctant to dilute their ownership 
share of crucial assets with major public goods properties.
Main assumptions behind our calculations
Focus on a virtual integrated TSO
In order to identify constraints at the scale of the European transmission grid industry, we 
considered a best-case scenario, for which full cooperation (or integration) between the 
national or regional TSOs would be achieved. We hence made the assumption that the 
different European (i.e. members of ENTSO-E) TSOs could be virtually aggregated into a 
single European TSO, facing the whole volume of investments. 
Note that, when relaxing this assumption, smaller TSOs facing significant investment needs 
and ownership-restrictions might be exposed to more challenging local constraints that 
would not appear in this study. 
Calculation of revenues and tariffs
In this study, the volume of investment is exogenously determined and is independent 
from the financing strategy. A detailed description of the investment profiles employed 
can be found in Box 2. 
It was assumed that both operating expenditures and capital expenditures would be di-
rectly passed through to consumers. Costs related to the provision of system services were 
2. Even in situations of private ownership (as in Belgium, Italy and Spain), public entities still hold a large 
minority share.
Box 1: A tailor-made quantitative approach to financeability
In order to assess the quality of the financial ratios of the single TSO, we used the methodology 
employed by the rating agency Moody’s to establish the rating of companies developing regulated 
electric and gas networks. 
We focused on the main quantitative metrics used by the rating agency Moody’s. Each of them 
account for 15% of the overall rating, and about 40% of the quantitative part of the rating. The ad-
justed Interest-Cover Ratio is calculated as Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by 
interest payments: it reflects the flexibility of the regulated TSOs to pay interests on their debts. 
The Gearing level is calculated as the volume of debt divided by the total value of the Regulated 
Asset Base: it represents the loan to value ratio. 
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excluded, but losses and other network-related OPEX were taken into consideration. Tariffs 
were then determined as the sum of these costs and of a fixed return-on-assets.  
Box 2: Estimation of the required capital expenditures over 2012-2030
Each of our scenario features a scenario for new developments, as well as a scenario for infra-
structure renewal.
Two alternative scenarios for investments related to new projects
The first scenario (‘Extended TYNDP’) was based on the ten-year network development plan 
published by ENTSO-E for the period 2012-2021. We extended this scenario by considering in-
vestments needs would follow the same trend until 2030. The total volume of investment by 2030 
would amount to € 207 billion.
The second scenario (‘EC roadmap’) was based on the Impact Assessment of the Energy Road-
map 2050 published by the European Commission in 2011 and featured investment needs equal 
to € 155 billion by 2030.
One complementary scenario for infrastructure renewal
A major share of the existing infrastructure will have to be replaced in the coming decades. We 
used the results of calculations realised by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2011, and sub-
tracted savings realised thanks to investment in new projects. The resulting need for investment 
would amount to €55 billion by 2030. 
Annual investment costs in the ENTSO-E area over the period 2012-2030 (€2012 Billion) 
New developments Renewal costs
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We also referred in our analysis to “current trends in the 
evolution of transmission tariffs”. In this case, the annual 
growth of tariffs is limited to the average increase in the 
ENTSO-E area over the last 3 years, i.e. CPI+1.04%.
Results 
Results in the BAU scenario
Under the financing strategy applied in our business-as-
usual (BAU) scenario, there is no injection of external eq-
uity into the TSO, and the pay-out ratio is equal to 70%. 
Our results indicate that there is a clear financeability issue: with a financing strategy purely 
based on debt emission, and with a rise in tariffs limited to current trends, both investment 
scenarios would lead to a severe degradation of the TSO financial status. If an investment-
grade were to be maintained under the current trend in tariffs, it would only be possible 
for the TSO to develop 47% of the new investments planned in the TYNDP scenario, and 
61% of the EC Roadmap scenario. 
We estimated the increase in tariffs required to ensure the financeability of 100% of our 
first investment scenario (extended TYNDP) to be equal to an annual rate of CPI+3.4%, 
roughly three times the trend observed in the past years. Similarly, ensuring financeabil-
ity of our second investment scenario (EC Roadmap) would require an annual increase in 
tariffs equal to CPI+2.1%. 
Note that the two most important sources of increase would be depreciation and interests 
payments, with rise of dividends only accounting for a minor share of the total increase. 
Alternative financing strategies
We then studied the impact of two alternative financing strategies to achieve a higher share 
of the investment program while keeping tariffs at a lower level.
In the “Issue additional equity” scenario, the high dividend pay-out ratio is maintained but 
the TSOs issue additional equity (instead of debt) to finance capital expenditures. 
In the “Shift to growth model” scenario, the dividend pay-out ratio is lowered and TSOs re-
tain earnings in order to finance capital expenditures internally. Shareholders do not receive 
their return as cash but from holding the share for a while and selling it at a higher value. 
By increasing the equity share (whether internally or externally), it is possible to finance a 
larger share of investments program while conserving an investment-grade. Yet, as the costs 
Getting European Electric-
ity Transmission Infra-
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of interests on debt are fixed and lower than the costs of equity, injecting further equity 
while maintaining tariffs at the same level will result mechanically in reducing the ROE. The 
extent to which external sources of equity can be used to finance large-scale investments 
without increasing tariffs is therefore limited. 
However, by injecting a small share of external equity, or retaining a slightly higher share 
of the earnings, it is possible to achieve the whole scale of the investment program while 
conserving the same return on equity and reducing the needed increase in tariffs. 
Figure 1: Average annual increase in tariffs required over the period 2012-2030 to 
achieve a given average ROE while conserving investment grade for different financing 
strategies in the ‘Extended TYNDP’ scenario
Higher equity injection
Equity share in new investments
Lower dividend pay-out ratio
Dividend Pay-out ratio
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In the case of external equity injection, the optimum is reached for relatively small level 
of equity injections, as illustrated in Figure 1. In order to achieve a 8% post-tax nominal 
ROE, the minimum annual increase in tariffs is obtained for equity injections equal to 8% 
of financing needs, which amount to €10 billion over the time period 2012-2030. In order 
to achieve a 10% post-tax nominal ROE, the minimum annual increase in tariffs is obtained 
for equity injections equal to 4% of financing needs, which amount to €5 billion over the 
time period 2012-2030.
Similar results can be obtained for the shift to growth model strategy. In order to achieve 
a ROE equal to 8%, the optimum is found for a dividends pay-out ratio equal to 55%. In 
order to achieve a ROE equal to 10%, the optimum is found for a dividends pay-out ratio 
equal to 65%. 
Note that in any case, a significant rise in tariffs would still be required to achieve the 
whole scale of the investment programs.
Policy implications
In this article we looked at the issue of financeability of 
investments in the transmission network with a different 
angle from existing works. More traditional issues include 
identifying and allocating costs and benefits, delivering ad-
equate incentives to TSOs, or getting access to debt at rea-
sonable costs. Our analysis revealed that in addition, even 
if all these challenges were solved, there could still be 
limits on TSOs’ ability to meet the need for investments. 
Pure debt financing will lead to a threat that the volume 
of the debt might become too important for TSOs to face 
repayments. This situation is reflected in the degradation 
of key financial metrics. It means that TSOs’ ability to meet 
their obligations would then be vulnerable to small perturbations of the allowed rate-of-
return. Financing institutions will only accept such a situation if the regulatory frame is 
very stable and if returns are guaranteed in the long-term. Rules put into place should in 
particular minimise the eventuality of a regulatory hold-up. 
Besides, according to our results, the business-as-usual financing strategy of TSO will not 
be the most adequate strategy to finance a significant wave of investments. Consequential 
savings could be achieved by resorting to alternative financing strategies. The imple-
mentation of these strategies will require an evolution of the perception of TSOs owners 
(mainly public entities), for instance opening TSOs to external sources of equity, and to new 
kind of investors attracted by growth entities. 
Financing Investment in 
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In any case, an increase in investment will lead to a sig-
nificant increase of costs, mostly to cover depreciation 
and interest payments. Transmission tariffs only constitute 
a small share of the total costs of electricity for consum-
ers, but a three-fold increase of their annual growth might 
nevertheless generate protests. It is important not to sacri-
fice significant benefits in the long-term to limit spending 
in the short-term. Similarly, it is key to make sure that the 
need for important sources of financing is perceived as be-
ing associated to real needs and not a result of bad manage-
ment and costs getting out-of control.
What Regulatory Frame to 
Implement the EU Infra-
structure Package?
Presentation by Jean-Michel 
Glachant
Chapter II
Market Design

Highlights
- The discussion about the need for and the pros and cons of a gas target model 
started around the beginning of 2010 and found its first point of culmination in the 
conclusions of the 18th Madrid Forum in September 2010 which invited stakehold-
ers to start a process to develop a EU Gas Target Model.
- Florence School of Regulation proposes a European gas target model with a special 
focus on market architectures and investment: The MECO-S Model. The MECO-S 
is a “Market Enabling, Connecting and Securing” Model describing an end-state of 
the gas market to be achieved over time.
- The common foundation of the MECO-S Model is the economic investment. In-
vestment aims at supporting the other pillars in realizing their respective goals e.g. 
in contributing to the creation of functioning markets or in contributing to im-
proved price alignment. 
1.  This PB is based on the Working Paper A Vision for the EU Gas Target Model: the MECO-S Model by 
Jean-Michel Glachant. 
The author particularly thanks Sergio Ascari (FSR gas adviser), Jacques de Jong and Leonie Meulman 
(Clingendael International Energy Programme), Albrecht Wagner (Wagner, Elbling and Company), 
Christophe Pouillon (GRT Gaz), Margot London (Eurogas) and Stephan Kamphues (ENTSOG). The au-
thor, however, underlines that the vision delivered in this paper is only his and does not bind or tie any of
these persons. Moreover, Sergio Ascari, Jacques de Jong and Leonie Meulman, on the other hand, pub-
lished separately their own conclusions. The author also wants to thank the experts of the Austrian and 
German National Regulatory Agencies, notably: Michael Schmöltzer, Markus Krug and Stefanie Neveling. 
However it is underlined that the vision that is expressed in the MECO-S model is the author and not 
theirs.
A Gas Target Model for the EU:  
Florence School Proposes MECOS1
Author: Jean-Michel Glachant 
Editors: Michelle Hallack and Miguel Vazquez
2011
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Gas Target Model: Definition and Objectives
A Gas Target Model (GTM) is a non-binding, top-down framework of principles and charac-
teristics that are as broad as possible, providing a description of how the market is expected 
to develop till 2020. This would serve as a tool for guiding and assessing the on-going process 
of developing framework guidelines and guidelines that are the foundations of the broader 
Network Codes under the 3rd Energy Market Package. In addition, its objective will also be to 
guide and assess the on-going process of the Gas Regional Initiatives. A GTM will furthermore 
have to take due account of the wider energy policy objectives with regard to sustainability and 
supply security. 
The 3rd Energy Market Package set into force in 2010 defines a 
number of structural elements towards realizing an architec-
ture for the internal market for gas. The most notable among 
these elements being the mandatory entry/exit organisation 
of TSO network access and the processes that shall lead to a 
harmonized system of European TSO network codes.
Now, many different stakeholders at European and national 
level are working on the implementation of the 3rd package. 
These include: lawmakers in the 25 member states with natu-
ral gas; regulators in the 25 member states with natural gas; 
ACER; ENTSOG; the EU Commission; members of comitology committees; TSOs, DSOs and 
their associations; suppliers, wholesalers, retailers and traders and their associations.
A challenge for these implementation efforts is that the 3rd Energy Market Package does not in-
clude a comprehensive vision of the organisation of network access across the European Union. 
For instance, the 3rd Energy Market Package does not say if every single TSO shall set up its own 
entry/exit system or if the number of entry/exit networks shall be smaller than the number of 
TSOs, if the TSO balancing system shall include distribution networks or not, if entry/exit net-
work access shall extend from transmission systems down to distribution networks or not, etc.
Depending on the answers to these questions certain issues might need to be addressed on a 
European level. For instance if the TSO balancing system includes distribution systems, the Eu-
ropean balancing harmonization has a much wider scope (and requires much more detail) then 
otherwise; also national action would be required, obligating DSOs to blend into that system. 
Or if the entry/exit systems shall include distribution systems, then action on a national level 
will be required to deal with the corollary cost (and tariff) issues for DSOs (which may receive 
a cost allocation from TSOs in such a system).
A Vision for the EU Gas 
Target Model: the MECO-S 
Model
WORKING PAPER  
by Jean-Michel Glachant
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The Target Model Coordinating the 3rd Package Implementation
Now the risk is that – within a very limited timescale – a lot of policy makers and other stake-
holders while doing their best to implement the 3rd Energy Market Package – interpret and 
implement the package in a different way or work on different strands of implementation that 
– after having been elaborated in great detail – contradict each other. This problem is aggra-
vated by the fact that – inter alia due to resource limitations – not all European network codes 
envisaged at the moment (e.g. for capacity allocation management, balancing, interoperability, 
tariffs, etc.) can be developed at the same time.
It is in this potential problem area where a gas target model can play a beneficial role by helping 
to make visions about the future of the internal gas market transparent and by enabling discus-
sions about unifying those visions. The discussion about the need for and the pros and cons of 
a gas target model started around the beginning of 2010 and found its first point of culmination 
in the conclusions of the 18th Madrid Forum in September 2010 which invited “the Commission 
and the regulators to explore, in close cooperation with system operators and other stakeholders, 
Box 1 - The 3 Pillars of MECO-Target Model
•	 Pillar 1: Structuring network access to the European gas grid in a way that enables func-
tioning wholesale markets so that every European final customer is easily accessible from 
such a market.
•	 Pillar 2: Fostering short- and mid-term price alignment between the functioning whole-
sale markets by tightly connecting the markets through facilitating cross-market supply 
and trading and potentially implementing market coupling as far as the (at any time) 
given infrastructure allows. 
•	 Pillar 3: Enabling the establishment of secure supply patterns to the functioning whole-
sale markets. 
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the interaction and interdependence of all relevant areas for network codes and to initiate a process 
establishing a gas market target model”. Based on this conclusion CEER started – by the end of 
2010 – the process of developing a gas target model for Europe.
The MECO-S Target Model
The Florence School of Regulation proposes a European gas target model with a special focus 
on market architectures and investment. It is termed the MECO-S Model. The MECO-S is a 
“Market Enabling, Connecting and Securing” Model describing an end-state of the gas market 
to be achieved over time. The MECO-S Model rests on three pillars that share a common foun-
dation, making sure that economical investments in pipelines are realized
The MECO-S model aims at the creation of a number of functioning wholesale markets within 
the EU (together enabling easy access to all European final customers of gas), at connecting 
these markets tightly in order to maximize short- and mid-term price alignment between those 
markets, at enabling secure supply patterns to those markets and at making sure that all eco-
nomic investments in gas transmission capacity are done.
First Pillar: Wholesale Markets
Pillar 1 shall realize the goal of enabling functioning wholesale markets. Such markets are an 
essential feature of the internal market since they contribute to efficiency in managing gas and 
gas-related assets such as supply contracts, storage and gas-fired power stations. Additionally 
and no less importantly, such markets are an essential basis for retail competition. Finally, func-
tioning wholesale markets are a basis for market based balancing and market coupling. Without 
functioning markets, both of these concepts could not be harnessed. 
Pillar 1 is realized by structuring Europe into markets that are sufficiently sized2 and well con-
nected to sources of gas3  so that the emergence of a competitive traded wholesale market is 
likely. Where necessary with a view to that goal, member states have to create cross-border 
markets in order to increase market size and connectivity. 
2. i.e. ≥ 20 bcm of final customer consumption
3. i.e. at least three different sources of gas 
Box 2 - Two models to create cross -borders markets
•	 Market Areas, that implement integrated balancing zones reaching down to the final customers 
•	 Trading Regions, that implement integrated wholesale markets which are tightly connected to 
national end user zones
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The two models to create cross-border market are based on entry/exit systems. Moreover, both 
models may be used in parallel in Europe, whereby the market area model appears attractive 
for larger member states and the trading region model has specific merits for smaller member 
states that need to cooperate cross-border in order to gain sufficient market size and connectivity.
Second Pillar: Allocation of ‘gas-related assets’ in European Scale
Pillar 2 aims at maximizing the efficiency of managing gas and gas-related assets on a European 
scale by making sure that the existing interconnecting infra-
structure is put to the best use. The resulting tight connection 
of markets will lead to price alignment between European 
markets as far as the – at any time existing – infrastructure 
allows. Price alignment virtually unifies all European markets 
by enabling cross-portfolio optimisation via those markets on 
a European scale. Measures are foreseen so that TSOs do not 
suffer any loss from price alignment. 
Pillar 2 is firstly realized by implementing hub-to-hub trans-
port products and a number of harmonisation measures that 
make inter-market supply and trading significantly easier. The allocation of hub-to-hub trans-
port products shall be by auction for the mid- and short-term markets and by first come first 
serve for the intra-day market.
Secondly it is proposed to implement pilot projects for day-ahead market coupling to explore 
if the potential benefits of market coupling can be realized in practice for gas. If so, day-ahead 
market coupling would become an integral part of the MECO-S Model.
Third Pillar: Security of Supply
Pillar 3 aims at enabling secure supply patterns to the European markets. Specifically Pillar 3 
creates the preconditions for underpinning long-term supply contracts with appropriate trans-
port products, taking into consideration that currently about 30% of all gas consumed in Eu-
rope crosses more than one border point. Additionally Pillar 3 aims at providing a market based 
solution for realizing transport security of supply where collaboration with adjoining markets 
is required.
Pillar 3 is realized by foreseeing the execution (if demanded by shippers) of new long-term 
transport contracts. These contracts can be requested periodically in an open season style pro-
cess for the full term of interest to the shipper, e.g. 15 years. If in the process the demand for 
long-term capacity proves higher than the availability of such capacities, then capacities will be 
expanded by investment if they are economical. In order to allow for such investment, the lead 
time for allocating long-term capacity shall always be at least as long as the time required for 
A “Target Model” for the 
Internal Gas Market
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expanding capacity. Since in this structure capacity can always be expanded, long-term capacity 
is not a scarce good anymore and auctioning of that capacity can be avoided. Allocation ques-
tions at the fringe of the allocation problem can be solved by an optimisation procedure.
In order to deal with shippers interested in long-distance transport (e.g. from a European bor-
der point to the next but one market) link chain products are introduced. Link chain products 
are packages of (hub-to-hub) transport products at several border points on a continuous route 
that may be requested by the shipper as a whole and are allocated at the same level of capac-
ity on all requested border points. After allocation they may be used as separate hub-to-hub 
capacities. 
In the area of transport security of supply the instrument of the fall-back capacity contract is 
introduced. It provides a means for member states to secure that sufficient capacity in a neigh-
bouring market is made and kept available in order to cater to the security needs of said mem-
ber states. Under a fall-back capacity contract a TSO (A) of the member state in need of redun-
dant transport capacity (as defined by a competent authority) books the required capacity long 
term with a neighbouring TSO (B). TSO B charges TSO A only that part of the capacity that is 
not booked by shippers directly with TSO B (hence the name “fall-back contract”). TSO A al-
locates the cost for this security measure to final customers in his market.
Box 3: The Key Results of MECO-S on Investment
•	 Investment	appraisal	and	the	allocation	of	long-term	capacity	should	always	(even	on	existing	
systems) be an integrated process in the style of an open season (see also above under Pillar 3).
•	 The	quantity	of	capacity	that	shall	be	reserved	for	the	mid-	and	short-term	market	shall	be	cre-
ated (and hence invested) on top of any investment required to satisfy (economic) long-term 
capacity requests.
•	 The	economic	appraisal	of	investment	shall	take	into	account	the	return	from	long-term	con-
tracts as well as the value expected to be generated by price alignment due to the capacity 
reserved for the mid- and short-term markets. The cost for mid- and short-term capacities that 
are not directly recovered by tariffs shall be allocated to the beneficiaries. 
•	 In	case	TSOs	declare	that	they	can/will	not	invest	in	an	otherwise	economic	investment	pro-
ject, the project shall be tendered to the market. The scope of the tender would be to build and 
finance the pipeline (or other asset) against a yearly fee paid long-term. After construction, the 
realized project would be integrated into the operational responsibility of the respective TSO.
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MECO-S Model and network investment
As highlighted the common foundation of the MECO-S Model is economic investment. Invest-
ment aims at supporting the other pillars in realizing their respective goals e.g. in contributing 
to the creation of functioning markets (by new interconnection to these markets) or in con-
tributing to improved price alignment between markets (by new/expanded interconnection 
between these markets). Several issues are discussed in the study regarding investment includ-
ing the structuring of investment appraisal processes, the evaluation of investment in intercon-
nection and intraconnection pipelines and the financing of investment.

Highlights
- At the 18th Madrid Forum (2010) the discussion of an EU gas target model was of-
ficially launched. It aims at defining a non-binding vision giving coherence to the 
coming set of European gas framework guidelinesand grid codes.
- There is a European-wide consensus to ensure third party access to interconnec-
tions and to promote EU gas trade across the entire EU as to reach – let’s say 2014 
- a target model of “achievement of the internal market’.
- J.M Glachant (director of FSR) and S. Ascari (FSR gas adviser) agree that inter-
connection capacity is key to increasing trade among EU countries. However, they 
do not have the same view on who should decide on and who should pay for the 
needed investment, and how trading places should be selected.
1. This PB is based on the Working Papers An American Model for the EU Gas Market? by Sergio Ascari 
and A Vision for the EU Gas Target Model: the MECO-S Model by Jean-Michel Glachant.
A Gas Target Model for the 
European Union:  Contrasting 
MECOS and EURAM Proposal1
Authors: Sergio Ascari and Jean-Michel Glachant 
Editors: Michelle Hallack and Miguel Vazquez
2011
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Background
The 3rd package did not describe a “target model” – which says a lot on the absence of common 
vision of the matter among European countries. It did, however, ask for the creation of EU-wide 
network code(s) to facilitate cross border gas transactions. All the transmission system opera-
tors (TSOs) will then have to obey the single network code(s) when operating the transmission 
networks. To keep these network codes in line with European regulation aims, a set of binding 
or non-binding framework guidelines are developed by ACER and the European Commission. 
In this context, with the aim to give global coherence to these guidelines and code(s), the Eu-
ropean regulators launched a consultation process in July 2011 to define a gas market target 
model. It is a non-binding vision providing a unified frame on the future layout of gas market 
architecture. 
On the one hand, a target model should say how the available transmission capacity can be 
allocated (from the long to the short term), and how it could be expanded through new invest-
ments. On the other hand, the target model also has to define key characteristics of the gas 
trade, and indicate an institutional frame that fits with such characteristics. During the first 
semester of 2011, the FSR director and gas advisor posed for discussion two top-down target 
models: MECOS and EURAM. They are a European (MECOS) and an American (EURAM) 
models for Europe gas market architecture.
Box 1 - MECOS model main pillars
•	 The	network	access	should	enable	functioning,	liquid	and	competitive	wholesale	gas	markets.	
The guarantee will come from a regulated capacity access defined through EU code(s). The cor-
responding investment will involve a regulatory oversight at Member State and EU levels plus 
an indicative planning at the EU level. 
•	 The	model	promotes	short	and	mid-term	price	alignment	by	facilitating	cross-market	borders	
trading. It will also ease trade by implementing market coupling and by expanding the coupling 
of market areas. It assumes an increase of interconnection of the grids and a unification of the 
operation of market and network (entry/exit pricing; congestion management; balancing).
•	 MECOS	establishes	a	secure	supply	pattern	by	favouring	open	seasons	backed	with	transport	
long term contracts. These long term contracts, however, should not foreclose shorter term 
trade nor impede regulators from intervening in the initial capacity definition or the following 
contracting arrangement. Then “approved” network expansion not being implemented by the 
locally existing TSOs can be auctioned off to all other interested investors (the grid investment 
monopoly is made contestable at the margin).
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Summary of the proposed MECOS and EURAM target models
MECOS is a “Market Enabling, COnnecting and Securing” model describing the final state 
that the EU gas market should achieve over time (2015?, 2020?). The main aim is to guar-
antee to every European final customer easy access to a wholesale gas market respecting a 
minimum set of rules, notably those “enabling” and “connecting” markets (the EU consumer 
is guaranteed both a certain access and a certain set of market rules). EURAM (EURopean 
American Model) distinguishes from MECOS in underlining the importance of including 
the market supply forces at the core of the model definition, especially in the definition of the 
transport investment and market arrangements. Building on these contrasting approaches, 
these two target models propose different solutions to transport network development and 
allocation, as well as to the promotion of gas hubs.
The two target models, while sharing some common views, propose different solutions es-
pecially with regard to transport investment. MECOS seeks a regulated development of the 
network targeted at facilitating EU gas trade and a plan of market areas expansion. This would 
be done by an ex-ante definition of the efficient network and the well-functioning market 
places. EURAM relies on freeing market forces to permit them to define the development 
of an efficient network according to their market strategies. Public interest can be added to 
market forces here or there, but it cannot replace them as the engine of grid expansion and 
market place (hubs) building. Trade will occur where there is trade and traders. Trading ar-
rangements should follow traders’ needs.
Box 2 - EURAM model main propositions
•	 EURAM does not challenge all MECOS proposals. It mainly aims at correcting MECOS 
where it deviates too much from the proper dynamics of market supply forces.
•	 The gas transport network is not necessarily a natural monopoly, and thus its regulation frame 
need to take into account its competitive potential and favour it. The competitive potential in 
transportation is a key source of efficiency improvement which should be accounted for and 
promoted. Actually, if market forces push gas transport investment as in the U.S, congestion 
constrains	requiring	auctions	and	other	managements	should	be	very	rare.
•	 Network tariff regulation should be streamlined across Europe and designed in a way to 
properly address issues arising from cross border trade, including the transfer of capacity 
rights to (and payment by) downstream market players including possibly TSOs.
•	 It is not just network investment which should take market forces into account, but the prop-
er development of hubs. Regulators cannot build or design market places by themselves. They 
can	only	enable	a	dynamic	market	play	or	not.	The	risk	of	too	many	hubs	would	be	liquidity	
fragmentation, and hence the delay of real market integration.
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The role of gas transport networks
TSOs cannot create markets just by themselves, but they are a central part of the industry chain 
where gas markets operate.
Existent Capacity
Both MECOS and EURAM models agree on using an entry/exit frame to allocate transport 
capacity. In Europe, the entry/exit scheme is widely seen as a pre-condition to create function-
ing markets.
However the degree of centralization in the capacity alloca-
tion differs in the two models. MECOS proposes centralized 
auctions of standardized transport products via virtual hubs, 
and does not conceive any other place to trade. The various 
virtual hubs could be unified by fully merging their corre-
sponding markets. One can also create a single hub on the 
top of the existing end users’ balancing zones through the 
creation of “trading regions” (with separated balancing ar-
eas). MECOS also strongly supports implicit auctions as the 
mechanism to allocate capacity in the shorter term (at least 
Day Ahead) and recommend experiencing it through pilots.
EURAM, on its side, still values explicit mechanisms to allocate capacity. The capacity market 
could be reinforced by the use of an open subscription process, which is close to a kind of co-
ordinated EU-wide open season. This would be based on a common trading platform covering 
all the EU capacity market. In the case of congested lines, EURAM suggests using shorter-term 
auctions. EURAM does not see the necessity of trading in any virtual points, as trading is likely 
to concentrate in few markets. However market coupling may remain a valid option for short 
term trade involving congested cross-hub capacity. 
New Capacity
One	of	the	main	consequences	of	including	the	active	role	of	markets	in	network	development	
can be noted in the divergent proposals of EURAM and MECOS models. 
The MECOS model addresses the investment in inter-connection and intra-connection mainly 
under a regulated environment. The inter-connection should include long-term contracts as 
well. Thus, MECOS proposes an open season process to deal with the inherent uncertainties 
on investing in new interconnections. This open season process would have to be performed 
periodically for all existing interconnection capacity and on demand. 
According to the MECOS model, the decision to build a new interconnection infrastructure 
should be based on:
An American Model for the 
EU Gas Market?
WORKING PAPER 
by Sergio Ascari 
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•	 The contract signed through the open season process where the shippers are able to sign 
‘long term contracts’
•	 The capacity expected be contracted in the future through short and mid-term mechanisms.
And the revenue to pay for this capacity should also come from these two kinds of capacity:
•	 The long term contracts should pay part of the capacity cost.
•	 The other part of the cost should be paid by the TSO’s network tariffs.
Therefore, the TSOs may accept to bear a share of the utilization risk associated with construct-
ing capacity for a short- and mid-term market in exchange for a higher rate of return on that 
part of investment. 
Moreover, according to MECOS, the intra-connection pipelines investment risk should be 
borne by the regulated tariffs. Thus, inside national/regional market the TSO and the authority 
responsible for including the asset in the regulated revenue are actually the main players decid-
ing investment localisation and amounts.
The EURAM model diverges in underlining the importance of market forces in investment 
decisions. The open subscription process would be the tool to allocate existent capacity on a 
long term basis, and also to give information to market players regarding the demand to build 
new capacity. This model does not exclude the possibility to have public intervention, as all 
stakeholders (public and private) should be able to bid in the open subscription process. The 
investment in interconnections should be mainly decided and paid for by long term contracts. 
EURAM agrees with MECOS in advocating that some capacity should be kept to be allocated 
in the middle and short term. 
In summary, the EURAM model supports that third party access should be guaranteed mainly 
by allowing all players to contract under harmonized conditions, instead of increasing the use 
of implicit auctions. 
Hub Development
The two proposed target models aim to promote the connection between markets increasing 
the	liquidity	of	the	European	cross-border	trade.	The	tools	proposed,	however,	differ.
MECOS aims to allow all EU end-users to allocate gas at any point of the network. Thus:
•	 All end-users should be inserted in a market (either national or regional).
•	 The cross-border trade should be promoted by virtual trading points to allow changes of 
ownership and accounting of gas flows by merging markets or by region trades.
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EURAM implies a different view regarding the development of European hubs:
•	 Hub development is seen as a result of market forces incentives. Furthermore, they will 
present different sizes and relative importance, depending on the interest of players to 
trade in them.
•	 It highlights the recommendation that the regulatory role developing hubs should focus 
just on the harmonization of rules, instead of developing inefficient hubs.
In that environment, and observing the evolution of the US gas market, the EURAM proposal 
foresees that the number of hubs will probably be significantly smaller than the number of 
national markets.
Comparing the proposals
The main differences between the two models are related to the reliance on the potential advan-
tages of introducing competition in gas transport networks. 
The MECOS proposal follows the approach of adapting the spirit of the power networks regu-
lation to the regulation of gas networks. Loosely, present European power network regulation 
seeks	promoting	efficient	markets	by	the	use	of	implicit	auctions	to	ensure	the	adequate	use	of	
infrastructures, and by the centralized planning of the network. 
On the other hand, EURAM observes that several physical features of gas industry are not so 
close to the power sector, which makes the gas network subject to potential liberalization to 
enhance its efficiency. This can be thought of as one of the main motivations for the EURAM 
proposal, which seeks to introduce more competition in the gas transportation activity, es-
pecially focusing on network investment decision, paralleling in some ways the US scheme. 
Box 3 - Inter-connection and intra-connection pipelines
•	 The interconnection pipelines are the ones which help to connect separated markets bet-
ter and thereby improve the price alignment among different markets. The access of these 
pipelines is the key to allowing the interconnection between the different European markets.
•	 The intra-connection pipelines are the infrastructure which fulfils its task within a market 
(i.e. within an entry/exit area) and often under control of national or sub-national TSOs. 
Increasing the intra-connection capacity can either serve increased demand in a market or 
can help to ‘debottleneck’ an entry/exit area, which means decreasing the ‘balance’ costs as-
sociated to entry/exit model.      
55
FLORENCE  SCHOOL OF REGULATION
However, EURAM keeps the main ideas of EU network code(s) as proposed by the Third Pack-
age. It keeps the regulation of capacity use still close to MECOS proposition based on entry/
exit model and national tariffs, rather than the bilateral contract model mainly applied in the 
interstate USA frame.
The two proposed models have many similarities, as they do not disagree in the main aspects 
defined by the European 3rd package. However, they fundamentally disagree on the role that 
markets (or long term contracts) should play regarding the use of gas transport networks, the 
development of market hubs and, regarding decisions on network investments (even when 
public intervention is accepted in the two models). 
 
 

Highlights
 – Due to the significant role already played by gas-fired power plants and the 
on-going integration of renewables into the existing network, the relationship 
between the gas and electricity markets is becoming ever closer. As a result, we 
must consider if the existing gas and electricity market designs can cope with 
these changes or whether some market redesign is required in gas, electricity 
or both.
 – The decision to invest and trade is dependent on existing market designs, par-
ticularly concerning trade timeframes and geographical zones. A design which 
is too weak may create the possibility of cross-subsidies between time or space 
flexible users and inflexible ones within each of the gas or electricity market 
design and between them.
 – With an increasingly close relationship between gas and electricity market de-
signs, the role of the TSOs may have to evolve. If transmission networks are 
facing a higher industry-specific or cross-industry demand for flexibility, in-
creased coordination between operation and planning may be required from 
both gas TSOs and electricity TSOs.
 – Whether the current electricity generation is adequate depends increasingly on 
the current conditions of access to natural gas. If gas is to play such a significant 
role in the security of electricity supply, compatibility between long-term ar-
rangements in gas and in electricity markets must be ensured
1. This PB summarises the discussion of the LdP Academic Roundtable Redesigning Gas and Electricity Markets 
to Work Together? held on 13 October 2012 at the Florence School of Regulation.
LdP Academic Roundtable
Redesigning Gas and Electricity 
Markets to Work Together1
Authors: Arthur Henriot, Miguel Vazquez, Michelle Hallack, Jean-Michel Glachant
2012
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Background
The interaction between gas and electricity markets is not a new phenomenon. Gas and 
electricity can be competitors, for instance, when a consumer is to install a boiler; but gas 
can also be an input for gas-fired power plants (GFPPs) to generate electricity as long as the 
spark spread is high enough (See Figure 1).
This interaction becomes, however, increasingly significant in a context of large-scale de-
velopment of variable renewable energy sources (RES). GFPPs indeed appear as the technol-
ogy that is most likely to provide the flexibility needed to cope with the technical challenges 
introduced by variable RES in power systems.2  
Gas and electricity have very different physical properties. Gas flows more slowly than 
electricity, and is also much less expensive to store. Moreover, gas systems feature inherent 
flexibility thanks to linepack storage. The balancing in gas systems is therefore less chal-
lenging than in power systems. Consequently, the way markets have been defined in both 
industries is very different. It is still considered by many today that the two industries should 
be addressed independently.
2. For more details, see IEA(2012): The Impact of Wind Power on European Natural Gas Markets.
Figure 1: Market integration of gas, heat, and electricity (source: Energinet)
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However, if the demand for flexibility in electricity markets is to be met by flexibility in the 
gas markets, coordination between gas markets and electricity markets will be needed 
both in the short-term and in the long-term. In the short-term, the choice of consuming 
gas to generate electricity, for instance, in case of imbalances in the electricity market, will 
be made depending on the corresponding opportunity-costs and technical constraints. In 
the long-term, electricity transmission investments can for instance be a substitute for gas 
pipelines, which then strongly impacts the location of power plants and gas storage assets.
Short-term interactions between gas and electricity markets
Issue 1: Is harmonisation between the gas and electricity industries required or do the existing 
market differences simply reflect different technical realities? 
Most of the flexibility provided by gas markets is not priced to the gas network users who 
then do not perceive the flexibility costs. Some might argue that GFPPs are simply another 
consumer of gas and that their needs will be met naturally. 
This implies that the gas system always responds to the new 
needs born inside the electricity system. However, the mar-
kets taking place in gas and electricity are not based on the 
same set of rules. The time and place of delivery matter for a 
gas consumer or an electricity consumer, and the way time 
frames and geographical zones are defined will therefore 
impact the behaviour of these players. Price-signals associ-
ated with this flexibility depend in turn on the definitions 
of those zones. 
In the European Union (EU), simplifications have been in-
troduced with the aim to enhance competition and market 
integration: intra-zone constraints are not fully considered while inter-zone constraints 
are taken into account with imprecise proxies. These simplifications result in misguided 
behaviour and hence efficiency loss. In addition, the zones are defined following political 
realities that often do not match physical realities. Decisions to invest and trade are taken 
based on these sets of institutionally-established zones. Distortions could occur within the 
gas sector and the electricity sector but also in-between both industries. 
Issue 2: Will the current market frameworks allow trading in a flexible way? Does a new con-
text require a new market design? Should balancing responsibility be increasingly transferred 
from TSOs to participants?  
As most of the existing schemes were designed to handle large and stable flows of gas and 
electricity, they might be challenged in a more volatile environment. The simplifications put 
Debate on the topic    
at FSR
LdP Academic Roundtable 
Redesigning Gas and Elec-
tricity Markets to Work To-
gether?
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into place by market designers do inevitably determine the business-models for flexible 
generation assets, storage assets, and transmission assets. Relying on simplifications leads 
to cross-subsidies between flexible users and inflexible ones inside each industry and across 
them. In any simplification of a market, there is a trade-off. One option is to expose all par-
ticipants to each category of costs that they generate and to reduce the socialisation created 
by the improper definition of trade timeframes and market zones. From the viewpoint of the 
gas market, decreased socialising comes with the possibility for users to reveal their prefer-
ences on flexibility. Another option is the exact opposite, which is to enlarge or simplify 
trade horizons and market zones. This calls for an easing of access to flexibility within the 
energy system(s) and to socialising the costs created by longer timeframes and larger zones. 
In certain gas market design, the short-term market (as within-day) does not exist yet. This 
“missing market” is key in understanding the short-term interaction challenges between gas 
and electricity.
Long-term interactions between gas and electricity markets
a) Coordination of investments
Issue 3: Is the current level of coordination between gas and electricity TSOs sufficient to ensure 
delivery of the needed investments? 
Figure 2: Illustration of mutually exclusive investments 
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Assets involved in the transmission of gas and power, as well as generation assets, feature 
high capital costs and long life expectancy, and they require long planning delays and long 
construction times before operating. Investment decisions are therefore strongly affected 
by uncertainty regarding the future environment. In particular, the profits generated by an 
asset are impacted by the investment decisions taken by other players, both within the same 
industry and in the other industry. Figure 2 illustrates the case of two competing invest-
ments that are mutually exclusive. 
Transmission assets owners in Europe are regulated; their remuneration depends on the ap-
proval of a national regulatory authority. The planning of investments is then decided at a 
national level, generally proposed by the TSO and approved by a national authority. As the 
relationship between the power sector and the gas sector becomes increasingly significant, 
the coordination level between Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in the gas and 
electricity sector should increase as well.
Issue 4: How are the distortions between price-signals re-
ceived in the gas and the power sector impacting the invest-
ment decisions made by participants? 
Distortions in short-term price-signals affect long-term 
decisions taken by the participants. If the network system 
flexibility can be used for free, network users will not have 
enough incentives to invest in other kinds of flexible assets. If 
the price-signals received by participants in one of the indus-
tries do not reflect the real characteristics, misguided invest-
ment decisions will lead to inefficiency across both industries.
Issue 5: How to ensure that TSOs receive the adequate incentives to invest and efficiently op-
erate these new assets? Can the old model adapt to this new role of the TSOs? Are there any 
competition issues regarding the operation of flexibility assets by TSOs?
The role of the TSOs will have to evolve if transmission assets are used to deliver a high 
amount of flexibility. Gas TSOs can for instance offer more line-pack capacity but this will 
reduce the available transportation capacity; electricity TSOs might have to invest in storage 
capacities (as it is already the case in Italy) or in demand response. It is not clear today how 
TSOs will deal with conflicting incentives between the need of an efficient operation of the 
network and the existing regulatory frame governing the ownership of various assets able 
to deliver flexibility. 
A Combined View on the 
Market Design for Gas and 
Power
WEBINAR 
by Miguel Vazquez
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b) Long-term contracts and security of supply
Issue 6: How can compatibility of long-term security of supply in the power and in the gas 
systems be ensured, for instance, at times of difficulties in both?  Should gas arrangements be 
driven by power system reliability? 
Gas can play a significant role in long-term security of supply of electricity. As gas is 
cheaper to store than electricity, the amount of energy stored in gas storages is much higher 
than the amount of energy stored in electricity storage (see Figure 3). Similarly, energy can 
be transferred between two countries through cross-border gas transmission or electricity 
transmission. 
However, there might be some tensions in case of difficulties in gas or electricity or both. 
What would the status of GFPP electricity producers then be compared to the other gas 
consumers: should the gas flow to generate electricity or for more specific gas uses? What if 
long-term contracts to supply GFPPs are disturbed due to political choices restraining the 
use of gas?  
Figure 3: Energy Storage capacities in Europe (source: Energinet)
Issue 7: Will new kinds of gas supply contracts emerge when needed or are there any barriers to 
their development? Does the lack of adequate gas supply contracts constitute a barrier to entry 
in the generation sector?
Gas supply contracts may have many dimensions, such as firm versus interruptible, rigid 
versus flexible, short term versus long term, etc. An important issue is the need for gas 
contracts that are both long-term and flexible for GFPPs operating as back-up units. The 
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existing supply contracts have not been designed for flexible power production. However, 
flexible contracts may allow consuming a maximum amount of energy per year without any 
constraint on the consumption pattern.
Moreover, it is worth underlining that the incompatibility between gas and electricity usages 
and arrangements may appear with transmission contracts. While cross-border gas supply 
is based on long-term network contracting, power markets do not allow long-term reserva-
tion of capacity. In case of cross-border paths, both the gas and the electricity interconnec-
tions should be explicitly taken into account in long-term contracts and left to short-term 
implicit allocation.

Chapter III
EU Energy Policy

Highlights
 – In the spring of 2007, the European Council agreed on a policy vision with three 
components: the green component (to promote a sustainable energy economy), 
the market component (to enhance efficiency and competition) and the security of 
supply component (to secure the EU’s energy supply).
 – With regard to these three components, distinct implementing paths and action 
lines were developed. The existence of separate implementing paths entails some 
coordination issues. Coordition is necessary here to guarantee that the three action 
lines are integrated into a consistent EU Energy Policy.
 – EU Energy policy needs to get smarter and align the incentives deriving from the 
three components to produce an integrated vision that moves beyond 2020. 22 
policy recommendations can then be formulated for the most relevant energy-
related issues which the EU is facing nowadays.
1. This PB is based on the Working Paper Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 
Recommendations by Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner and Jacques de Jong.
Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy:
Rationale and 22 Recommendations1
Authors: Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner and Jacques de Jong 
Editors: Jean-Michel Glachant and Emanuela Michetti
2010
68
European Energy Policy: Could it be better?
Background
The EU is in desperate need of an Energy Policy. But first and foremost: 
do we really have to start from scratch? Or does this policy already exist? 
In the spring of 2007, the European Council agreed on a policy vision with three components: 
the green component (to promote a sustainable energy economy), the market component 
(to enhance efficiency and competition) and the security of supply component (to secure the 
EU’s energy supply). It gave us three “mantras” as a basis for a variety of policy and regulatory 
proposals and actions: Kyoto, Lisbon and Moscow (Box 1).
Separated action lines
What we call “EU energy policy” is basically a basket of a number of policies linked to energy 
issues. Distinct implementing paths and action lines were developed after the 2007 European 
council: the green component was mainly dealt with by Green Package; the market compo-
nent by the 3rd Energy market package; while the security of supply component was addressed 
by the 2nd Strategic Energy review and gas new regulation. 
Each of these action line is facing several challenges. What 
makes grids smart?
Kyoto: The CO2 market needs to be tightened and harmo-
nised across the EU to be effective. This calls for a strong and 
centrally regulated EC role, including effective monitoring 
and a centralised auctioning process. Further calls for a car-
bon tax or even emission performance standards are adding 
to the debate. On the road towards 2050 strong innovation 
push and pull programmes are necessary, requiring not only 
massive investments but also more stable and effective regula-
tory regimes as well as a European level playing field for tech-
nology deployment.
Lisbon: By definition, a competitive energy market requires pro-competitive regulation and 
pro-competitive industry structures. Which are not so easyto achieve at EU-level, though. 
On the one side, National Regulatory Authorities have a national focus that does not always 
allow looking at cross-border issues in the wider EU interest, while, on the other side, the EU 
Directives and detailed regulation, including the most concrete actions for crossing borders, 
are still submitted to the willingness of the Member States to cooperate. Finally, industry re-
structuring can only take place in the context of the EU’s Competition Policy when mergers 
and acquisitions are on the table or when competition cases are at stake (“smoking guns”).
Toward a Smart EU Energy 
Policy: Rationale and 22 
Recommendations
WORKING PAPER 
by Jean-Michel Glachant, 
Robert Grant, Manfred 
Hafner and Jacques de Jong
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Moscow: EU external SoS policy has no infrastructure development plan and no energy long 
term contracting framework to make deals with foreigners. The competence European Com-
mission has on external trade (see our “open sky” policy with the USA) has not produced yet 
any common frame for energy external trade. We still lack concrete means and instruments to 
put the EU external energy policy into practice.
The existence of these separate implementing paths entails some coordination is-
sues. Coordination is necessary here to guarantee that the three action lines are inte-
grated into a consistent EU Energy P olicy. To what extent these three action lines are co-
ordinated? Are there conflicting relationships among the three separated action lines? 
The figure in Box 2 illustrates how coordination issues may lead to questions about the consist-
ency of the EU Energy Policy.
Policy recommendations
The three components of the EU energy policy influence each oth-
er leading to significant policy trade-offs and calling for greater coordination. 
Generally speaking, the EU Energy policy needs to get smarter and align the incentives deriv-
Box 1 -   The three “mantras” of the EU Energy Policy
•	 Kyoto, the green issue: In the late 1980’s energy related environmental issues be-
came a truly European domain and Kyoto was immediately adopted by the 
EU. The EU’s leadership in this respect brought to the translation of Kyoto 
into a market based mechanism, the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). More-
over, Kyoto is at the base of the “triple twenties” political targets for 2020. 
•	 Lisbon, the market issue: Lisbon was born in 1986 when the European Comm nity en-
acted its project to create a Common Market by 1992. The goal was to have market based 
economies with no internal barriers to trade, and a centralised monitoring system 
to review progress and to solve internal discrepancies. Energy markets liberalisation 
gained momentum with three successive packages: in 1996, 2003 and 2009, respectively. 
•	 Moscow, the security of supply issue: Russian gas supplies played an increasingly 
important role for the EU since the early 1980’s. Starting before the first oil crisis 
in the 70’s, the Commission was willing to define an external Community policy 
for energy supply. Nevertheless, this objective has never been achieved, as several 
energy crises (such as the 2006 and 2008 Ukrainian gas crisis) showed.
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ing from the three components to produce an integrated vision that moves beyond 2020. 22 
policy recommendations can thenbe formulated for the most relevant energy-related issues 
which the EU is facing nowadays: governance, energy efficiency, decarbonisation, infrastruc-
tures, single market and the e ternal dimension. 
General
1. Enhance internal policy coordination and consistency between the decarbonisation 
process, the internal market and the external supply demand
2. Develop a comprehensive overall Energy Market monitoring system in cooperation with 
the IEA
3. Develop a systematic review process for supply security standards 
Governance
4. Make adequate use of the new legal basis (directives and regulations plus Lisbon treaty) 
for comprehensive and integrated EU energy policymaking
5. Allow willing Member States to carry out regional European energy policy making an 
initiatives, while still preserving the overall EU consistency Energy efficiency
Box 2 - The interaction of the three implementing paths
Green Issue
Kyoto
Market Issue
Lisbon
Security of Supply  Issue
Moscov
Q: How to pull efficient RES deployement 
inside the EU internal market?
Q: Will further RES deployemment 
change the nature of EU energy markets
Q: How to pull efficient RES deployement inside 
the EU internal market?
Q: Will further RES deployemment change the 
nature of EU energy markets
Q: How to pull efficient RES deployement inside 
the EU internal market?
Q: Will further RES deployemment change the 
nature of EU energy markets
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6. Continue EU Action Plans and make them binding whenever effective
7. Consider the development of white certificate market models at regional to EU-levels
8. Consider the need for an EU policy approach to the deployment of smart metering and 
otherdemand side management measures for gas and electricity
9. Develop a coherent strategy and vision for the transportation sector
Decarbonisation
10. Strengthen the effectiveness of carbon emission mitigation mechanisms
11. Create a level playing field for all relevant low or zero carbon technology options for 
power generation
12. Develop a more pro-active EU-role with regard to the particularities of nuclear energy 
in the fuel mix
13. Develop a view on the EU fuel mix 
Infrastructures
14. Properly regulate key internal cross border infrastructures (gas and electricity) and 
create incentives for new investment
15. Develop a clear vision and road mapfor large-scale infrastructure expansion to 
accommodate large RES generation, coupled with a further expansion of demand side 
management comprehending smart metering and smart grid devices 
Single-market
16. Coordinate regional market integration and develop an effective EU mechanism to 
ensure coherency and consistency; monitor the PXs’ consolidation in a single pan-
European trade platform
17. Be more explicit and robust on the agenda, tasks and resources of the new Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
External dimension
18. Develop a consistent vision vis-à-vis external energy 
suppliers
19. Be smart with Russia
20. Be smart on single voices inside the European Council 
as inside the European Commissio
21. Take care of external gas supplies both at regional and 
EU levels
22. Seek global gas and coal energy dialogues in the G20 style such as with US, Canada, 
Brazil, South Africa, Australia, China, and so on.
EU Energy Policy in 2030?
INTERVIEW 
with Philip Lowe

Highlights
– The recent declarations of some European leaders demonstrated a new political 
impetus towards the Europeanisation of energy policy. Nevertheless, the complex 
allocation of regulatory competences between the EU and its Member States works 
against coordination and harmonisation
– A possible solution could entail some Member States to promote ad hoc common 
policies through Schengen-like agreements, i.e., binding international law agree-
ments outside the EU legal framework and thus escaping its formal and procedural 
requirements 
– Schengen-like agreements must however comply with the principle of supremacy 
of Union Law in order to be legally feasible
– The compliance with the supremacy principle can be assessed on the grounds of 
three operational criteria: pre-emption, primacy of EU law and subsidiarity
– The legal feasibility assessment conducted in the two areas of nuclear policy and 
security of gas supply shows that in the former area several of the most important 
licensing issues could be fruitfully integrated in a Schengen-like agreement  
1. This PB is based on the Working Paper Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like Agreements in European En-
ergy Policy: The Cases of Nuclear Cooperation and Gas Security of Supply by Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel 
Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque.
Legal Feasibility of Schengen-like 
Agreements in European Energy Policy: 
The Cases of Nuclear Cooperation and 
Gas Security of Supply1
Authors: Nicole Ahner, Jean-Michel Glachant and Adrien de Hauteclocque
Editors : Jean-Michel Glachant and Emanuela Michetti
2010
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Background
The recent declarations of some European leaders demonstrated a new political impetus to-
wards the Europeanisation of energy policy. Nevertheless, the complex allocation of authority 
and regulatory competences between the EU and its Member States works against coordination 
and harmonisation. Institutional paralysis, low reactivity to events as well as political horse-
trading are calling for an alternative legal framework for cooperation.
Differentiated integration in energy policy
A possible solution to enhance harmonisation in the area of energy could entail some pioneer-
ing Member States to promote ad hoc common policies escaping the formal and procedural 
requirements of EU law. In this case, some Member States could reach common positions and 
proceed faster on a specific energy policy area whilst others are unwilling or unable to do so. 
Such differentiation allows for a more flexible form of integration.
Differentiation has always been a reality of the European integration process. Certain well-
known successes like the Schengen Agreement have allowed progress without shaking the con-
stitutional order of the Union. Box 1 illustrates the development of the Schengen Agreement, 
Box 1 - The Schengen Agreement
Today the provisions of the Schengen acquis are fully applied by 22 EU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden), plus Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.
Schengen
Agreement
1985
Schengen
Convention
1990
Outside the EU legal framework
1995
Integration into EU acquis
(Treaty of Amsterdam)
1999
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established initially by 5 EU Countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Neth-
erlands) in 1985, when a more general consensus on abolishing the passport controls at the 
intra-Community borders could not be reached. 
Even though the Schengen regulation was integrated into the EU acquis in 1999, the agreement 
represents the archetype of closer cooperation between a number of Member States that started 
entirely outside the EU framework.
An alternative, Treaty-based means of differentiation is the “enhanced cooperation” - described 
in Box 2 -, which however, has not proved very successful so far. 
Conversely, Schengen-like agreements can be concluded by some Member States under inter-
national law, so-called “inter se agreements”. In practical terms, such agreements imply that the 
Member States abandon the narrow framework of EU Law and act under the broader frame-
work of international law, where they preserve treaty-making powers. 
The legal conditions for Schengen-like agreements are less onerous than the conditions set for 
the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Nevertheless, they are also subject to important legal 
limits and in particular, they must fully comply with the principle of supremacy of Union Law. 
Broadly speaking, the principle of supremacy of Union law means that an inter se agreement 
cannot be concluded where there is a risk of (actual of potential) interference with Union law. 
However, this principle is complicated to apply in practice. 
Legal feasibility assessment 
The assessment of the compliance of an agreement with the supremacy principle is a very com-
plex matter and requires a case-by-case analysis on the grounds of more operational criteria, 
namely pre-emption, primacy of EU law and subsidiarity, which all need to be fulfilled. Box 3 
illustrates the three assessment criteria. 
Box 2 - Three case studies
The enhanced cooperation regime is a form of differentiated integration introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. Remarkably, there has not been a single instance so far where 
this mechanism has been used in practice, mainly due to the rigidity of the procedur-
al requirements. Strict conditions apply, from the number of Member States required 
(nine) to the qualified majority needed to enact the initial authorisation.
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Two potential areas of application 
Schengen-like agreements are not legally feasible in every area of EU energy policy. 
The actual legal feasibility depends on the development of Union law which in turn 
often depends on the willingness of Member States to transfer competences at the Un-
ion level. In what follows a feasibility assessment for Schengen-like agreements is con-
ducted in two areas: nuclear policy and security of gas supply.
Box 3 – The assessment criteria
1st criterion: Pre-emption
Areas of exclusive Union competence: inter se agreements are illegal even if the Union 
law has not occupied the field yet.
Areas of shared competence and extensive occupation by Union law: inter se agreements 
are illegal in both cases where Union legislation exists (actual occupation) and where no 
legislation exists but the Union has a duty to fill the gap (potential occupation).
Areas of shared competence and non-extensive occupation by Union law: inter se agree-
ments are illegal if a case-by-case assessment on the substantive compatibility reveals 
a direct, non-minor and non-temporary conflict; inter se agreements are illegal also in 
absence of conflict if they interfere with the proper functioning of the Union system, the 
integrity of the Union legal order and the common organisation of the markets. 
2nd criterion: Primacy of EU law
According to Member States’ duty of sincere cooperation, the principle of primacy of 
EU law requires inter se agreements not to conflict in substance with general principles 
of Union law, e.g., non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. To fulfil this 2nd cri-
terion, a safeguard clause in the Schengen Agreement was introduced. It clearly stated 
that “The provisions of this convention shall apply only in so far they are compatible with 
Community law”. 
3rd criterion: Subsidiarity
Given the special qualities of Union law (certainty, enforcement, etc.), in fields of shared 
competence Union law should generally be preferred to inter se agreements as long as 
they do not create clear benefits compared with action at the Union level. 
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A. Nuclear policy
While some Member States (such as the UK, Italy and Romania) are today implementing or con-
sidering a long-term growth in nuclear capacity, several others (such as Ireland and Austria) re-
main resolutely opposed. It is unlikely that Europe will ever speak with one voice on matters of 
electricity generation mix and nuclear power, which is an exclusive competence of Member States. 
Moreover, Member States are subject to EU law and must comply with the Directives and Regula-
tions made under the EURATOM Treaty. The feasibility assessment on 3 possible areas of coop-
eration shows that inter se agreements could fruitfully integrate several important licensing 
issues concerning reactor design certification and the disposal of radioactive waste and spent 
nuclear fuel. 
I.  Market Rules
Why cooperate? An inter se agreement could clarify market rules for nuclear investors and op-
erators on the design and use of long-term contracts and on the creation of joint ventures, open 
seasons and investment in merchant lines.
Inter se agreement legally feasible? No.
Why? Pre-emption: Most market frame issues (such as long-term energy contracts and 
joint ventures) are under the jurisdiction of competition rules where the Commission 
enjoys exclusive competence. Generally, to the extent that nuclear energy competes on 
an equal footing with other energy sources in liberalized markets, an inter se agree-
ment distorting competition among producers cannot fulfil the pre-emption criterion. 
II. Disposal of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel
Why cooperate? Nuclear power raises important issues regarding waste: an inter se agreement 
could include provisions on disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel as 
well as the setting-up of regional centres of disposal.
Inter se agreement legally feasible? Yes, provided compliance is ensured with Directives on 
nuclear safety.
Why? i) Pre-emption: The Court of Justice recognised a shared competence in matter of nuclear 
safety, but at present waste management remains a national responsibility with Community 
legislation mainly covering safety issues; ii) Primacy: As long as foreign undertakings operat-
ing in one of the contracting Member States would not be precluded to use the new regional 
centre for disposal, the non-discrimination principle would be respected; iii) Subsidiarity: EU 
law explicitly states that regional cooperation could constitute an interim step to a Union-wide 
legislation in this area. 
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III. Reactors Design 
Why cooperate? The standardisation of reactor design would contribute to make the licens-
ing process more effective, stabilise the regulatory framework as well as increase international 
cooperation.
Inter se agreement legally feasible? Yes.
Why? i) Pre-emption: Reactor design is only subject to the 
common safety requirements. Union legislation does not go 
further with harmonisation and does not include any reci-
procity mechanism for design approval. There is movement 
towards harmonisation in licensing, but reactor design cer-
tification is done nationally; ii) Primacy: An agreement on 
common licensing requirements would contribute to create 
a level-playing field among nuclear operators of different na-
tionality; iii) Subsidiarity: Union law could be better used to 
consolidate the future acquis of an inter se agreement rather 
than initiate the harmonization of reactor design assessment 
itself.
B. Security of gas supply
High energy prices, the occurrence of regional supply shortfalls and above all, the increasing reliance 
on imports from third countries are reasons for unsettling concern for the security of gas supply. 
Nevertheless, security of gas supply policy basically happens at the national level and it is unlikely 
that the EU will be able to develop a coherent common policy on obtaining secure energy supplies in 
the short-term. The main challenges to a supply security policy at European level are political, both 
internally and externally. The feasibility assessment on 3 possible areas of cooperation shows that 
Schengen-like agreements are not well-suited. Internally, the Member States are pre-empted by 
the comprehensive regulation at EU level, while externally, a Schengen-like agreement is not 
possible as the objectives to be regulated touch upon areas of exclusive Union competence.
I. Transparency
Why cooperate? An inter se agreement could contain requirements for aggregating data at re-
gional level, releasing information and enhancing the relevance of the released information for 
regulators and market participants.
Inter se agreement legally feasible? No.
Differentiated Integration 
Revisited: EU Energy Poli-
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Why? Pre-emption: Transparency understood in the above falls under shared competence but 
occupation of the field by Union law is already very broad. The powers of ACER (Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) introduced by the 3rd package include network codes 
on these issues: a preliminary agreement on transparency will be therefore provided by ACER 
soon or later. Finally, the Commission itself is considering a possible future legislative initiative 
in this area.
II. Emergency
Why cooperate? An inter se agreement would allow a minimum level of harmonisation among 
countries, regulators, hubs and Transmission System Operators with regard to the different 
emergency plans defined by the Member States. 
Inter se agreement legally feasible? No.
Why? Pre-emption: The issue falls under shared competence but there is a broad occupation of 
the field by EU law: Member States treaty-making competence is limited.
III. External Supply Framework 
Why cooperate? An inter se agreement would allow coordination and information mechanisms 
for bilateral actions, arrangements and contracts based on a high level of transparency.
Inter se agreement legally feasible? No.
Why? Pre-emption: At least some of the aspects covered by the usual bilateral energy agree-
ments concluded between Member States and third countries are in the exclusive competence 
of the EU. In addition, the EU possesses an exclusive, implied external power relevant for the 
regulation of the EU external energy relations.

Highlights
 – The EU gas security of supply architecture has had some impressive developments. Today, 
security of energy supply as a goal in itself is not only enshrined in the European Treaties. 
Rather, it is also addressed directly and indirectly by various hard and soft law measures that 
tackle it from several complementary angles. 
 – However, judging from the lessons learned during past supply crises and the results obtained 
so far, the inevitable conclusion is that we have not yet achieved a European approach to 
ensuring gas security of supply within the EU.
 – A new EU gas security of supply architecture should distinguish between a long-term di-
mension, i.e. the post-2020 period and a short-term dimension, i.e. the period up to 2020. 
 – For both periods it is recommended to define a clear and articulated policy vision, long-term 
focusing on i) the (re-)definition of the role of gas in the EU energy fuel mix and energy 
system, ii) the EU external energy policy and iii) the achievement of the internal gas market; 
short-term focusing on i) the speedy implementation of the Third Energy Package, ii) the 
European Energy Infrastructure Package and iii) the EU energy solidarity concept.
 – The Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), together with the Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Loyola de Palacio Chair at the Robert Schuman Centre of 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute (EUI) and Wilton Park have organized a 
series of workshops in order to take stock and discuss a possible new architecture for EU gas 
security. Discussions and reflections reported from the workshops held under this project 
have developed into the following recommendations for a new EU gas security of supply 
architecture that are synchronized in this policy brief.1
1. The deliberations at the four workshops greatly informed the views expressed in this policy brief, but 
those views belong to the authors only and do not necessarily represent those of individual participants 
at the workshops or of the four supporting organisations. 
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Background
The future role of natural gas in the European energy system is highly uncertain. Several scenar-
ios, however, anticipate an increase of import dependence up to 80% by 2030. Notwithstanding 
such anticipation, a European approach to ensuring gas security of supply within the EU has 
not been achieved yet. 
Only very recently, some instruments addressing short- and long-term security of supply have 
been introduced at EU level. These include the Infrastructure Package or Regulation (EU) No 
994/2010. In 2011, the Commission presented the long awaited Communication on the exter-
nal dimension of energy policy, which identified ways to reinforce the efficiency of EU policies 
with regard to external energy relations. Is the EU on the right track to meet its stated objective, 
i.e. a European supply security policy? Is the current architecture on which the EU gas security 
of supply strategy is built able to deliver those responses needed to meet growing risks and 
changing realities? How should institutions and regulation adapt and respond?
The Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), together with the Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Loyola de Palacio Chair at the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced 
Studies, European University Institute (EUI), and Wilton Park have organized a series of work-
shops in order to take stock and discuss a possible new architecture for EU gas supply security. 
Discussions and reflections reported from these workshops have developed into the following 
concluding ideas and recommendations for a new EU gas security of supply architecture. 
The long-term vision
The long-term vision should cover three specific policy chapters: the role of gas in the energy 
fuel mix and energy system, the EU external energy policy focus and the EU internal gas market.
The role of gas 
Security of supply and security of demand are two sides of the same coin. Building market con-
fidence in the long-term is essential for both upstream and downstream investments and mar-
ket signals. The EU should therefore develop a clear vision of the role it sees for gas in its global 
energy mix as part of the 2050 Roadmap. A choice should be made whether gas will (again) 
be a “fuel of destination”, i.e. the fuel that gives in the medium and longer-term the most cost-
effective and sustainable solution? Or will gas rather be considered as a “fuel of transition”, i.e. 
the primary fuel that would help the EU on its road towards the carbon-free energy economy? 
Or, finally, will gas be considered as a “fuel of consequence”, i.e. the fallback option should other 
options fail to deliver at the necessary times?
Figure 1:  An EU gas security of supply architecture
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In any possible scenario on the role of gas in the energy system the interaction between the gas 
and power sectors will need to grow dramatically. That would mean that gas demand would 
become more and more a function of the power generating systems, due to its large advantages 
as a flexible fuel. In addition, new innovative concepts of gas-to-power and power-to-gas in-
teractions, including the application of electrolysis and storage technologies, will bring further 
options for the use of gas in the energy system. This changing role of gas will have without any 
doubt dramatic consequences for the use of the gas infrastructures (transmission and storage), 
with changing business models and increasing spot-oriented intra-EU trade. Market designs 
and regulatory designs will have to be reconsidered and the interaction between the power 
market and the various fuel markets, including the carbon market, will increase as well. If Car-
bon Capture and Storage (CCS) is to be applied at larger scales, fine-tuning between the gas and 
power chains with the carbon chain would become a further challenge. A new gas security of 
supply architecture should reflect on these developments in order to enhance supplier confi-
dence and consumer needs.
The external energy policy focus
External energy relations at the EU level, especially when external gas supplies are involved, 
should be built upon the vision mentioned above and should lead to specific strategies for the 
EU’s main suppliers. Taking due account of the developing global gas markets, focus should be 
put on, respectively, Norway, Russia, the Mediterranean region and the Caspian Basin. For each 
of these, it would be appropriate to create a specific mechanism for periodic discussion, review 
and institutionalized approaches regarding gas supplies and related relevant policy issues.  
As examples, the northern dimension could include the development of market structures and 
business models and could also give due account on the role of hydro as a storage option for 
managing intermittent energy sources, as well as the schemes for deploying large scale CCS. 
The eastern dimension should focus on the issue of mutual “win-win” schemes for applying 
Figure 1:  An EU gas security of supply architecture
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reciprocity criteria in both the upstream and downstream segments of the value-chain. Equally 
important would be the issues regarding East-West transit-lines on the way to and through EU-
markets, and eventually, the enhancement of the early warning systems in the case of supply 
interruptions.  The southern dimension could focus in a broader way on economic coopera-
tion, including energy issues. Changing geo-political structures in the region might bring new 
opportunities for using the wide variety of EU instruments. Global political cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region, including on renewable energy such as the Desertec project and the 
relating Medgrid or Medreg initiatives might bring new momentum. The SE-EU dimension 
and its strategic energy pathways between the East and the South would bring further options 
for the EU, building, where necessary, on the Energy Community Treaty framework, and could 
also include the ways and means of innovative gas purchasing schemes.   
The internal gas market
The EU should strive to remain, for all external suppliers and for all of the three possible visions 
on the role of gas, an attractive market for suppliers. The internal market model should reflect, 
therefore, the changing market structures and conditions that 
will need to develop from the broader vision of the role of gas. 
For instance, the emergence of gas as a fuel for delivering flex-
ibility and back-up in the increasingly RES-dominated power 
systems may have serious consequences for the prevailing gas 
market and regulatory designs. As part of the architecture, 
the EU should consider redefining its vision on the internal 
gas market, and remaining open to suggestions from its main 
external suppliers.   
This changing role of gas will have a particularly precise and 
challenging impact regarding issues that go beyond national 
authorities and policy-making: short-term and spot trades 
will need to increase to manage flexible market demand; cross-border exchanges will further 
develop; and cross-border arbitrages in the gas/electricity/carbon market dimensions will have 
to develop (relying more frequently on short-term capacity requirements in pipelines and inter-
connections, with resulting capacity (under)use and allocations). Transits will be an expanded, 
normal way of moving gas through EU markets, and infrastructure access and pricing will need 
to accommodate these flows. Storage will become more important, managing seasonal varia-
tions as well as much shorter-term daily or weekly variations.  
For these and other issues, effective cross-border regulatory oversight and designs will need 
to be developed further, perhaps more on regional levels than for the EU as a whole. A more 
articulated and defined view on the post-2020 EU gas market should be an essential element of 
A New Architecture for EU 
Gas Security of Supply
BOOK 
by Jean-Michel Glachant, 
Manfred Hafner, Jacques 
De Jong, Nicole Ahner and 
Simone Tagliapietra
85
FLORENCE  SCHOOL OF REGULATION
the EU’s security of supply architecture regardless of whether 
gas stays in the fuel mix for the next two to three generations 
or whether it is used solely as a back-up fuel in case other 
generating technologies do not deliver.
The short-term vision
The short-term vision should equally cover three policy chap-
ters: the Infrastructure Package implementation, the (expe-
dited) implementation of the Third Energy Market Package, 
and the fine-tuning of the concept of solidarity. The imple-
mentation of these two Packages requires timely decision-making for full application since the 
window-of-opportunity for the cost-effective transition to a low carbon energy economy is an-
ticipated to close around 2018. The long-term vision for the role of gas could be less meaningful 
if not supported by the short-term actions that are required. Short-term actions are therefore 
considered as the first step to moving beyond 2020. In addition, a further enhancement of the 
existing emergency mechanism would result in a strengthening of solidarity within the EU and, 
thus, contribute to global supply security.             
The European Energy Infrastructure Package
New investments in long-haul and cross-border pipelines for gas are critical components of any 
supply architecture. The Infrastructure Package covers a number of issues that call for timely 
implementation: enhancing the Project of Common Interest (PCI) process; streamlining the 
Cross-Border Cost-Benefit Analysis (CB-CBA) approach; expediting efficient CB-licensing and 
permitting; and specifying the role of public money versus private money. The three EU in-
stitutions should therefore work expeditiously on a decision on the Regulation, allowing it to 
enter into force as early as 2013. In addition, the various implementing devices, such as CBA-
methodologies and arrangements for CB-regulatory decisions could start as soon as 2012 if 
prioritization by ACER is allowed and facilitated. 
The Third Energy Package
The Third Energy Package is a solid basis for organizing the EU gas market and the TSO in-
dustry. Implementation does not yet have the proper priority at the national level, which influ-
ences the work at EU level. The process of establishing the Network Codes and the supporting 
Framework Guidelines should further facilitate a timely completion with some further political 
guidance, if necessary, by the Council. Refraining from addressing minutiae would streamline 
this process.  
A New Architecture for Gas 
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The ongoing cross-border restructuring process in the TSO sector, which could be considered 
as a positive step towards further market integration, may require additional attention in order 
to manage an effective and supportive TSO certification process. Once again, ACER plays an 
important preparatory role, especially when it comes to further strengthening the cooperation 
of NRAs.
Securing regulatory stability to allow the necessary market dynamics deserves continued atten-
tion by all stakeholders and authorities. The ongoing Regional Gas Initiatives (RGI) and other 
informal discussion platforms have roles to play in seeking specific solutions for regionally 
specific issues. If these mechanisms are working effectively, an EU-wide model for an internal 
gas market would become less urgent.
High-level attention is needed and should be given to the two issues that are of significant con-
cern to some of the EU’s external suppliers. The relevant conditions in the Third Package, i.e. 
on non-EU ownership in infrastructures and on efficient cross-border transiting of gas flows, 
should be further articulated and discussed with external suppliers at the proper levels. These 
issues can, and should, be solved over the course of the next year.        
The building of energy solidarity in the EU
The EU is on a promising path towards the building of an EU energy solidarity both ex ante, 
when it comes to institution building for crisis prevention, and on the spot, in terms of crisis 
management in a spirit of solidarity.
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply is the 
EU’s key solidarity instrument providing a solid basis for the management of unforeseen supply 
interruptions on a short-term basis. Certain issues that still need to be resolved or are missing 
can be overcome based on the experiences from past crises. The transposition of the lessons 
learnt into the existing framework can further refine and improve the procedure in place.
Ultimately, the prerequisite to solidarity is transparency. In this respect the increased efforts in 
the area of foreign energy relations with supplier countries play an important role. Following 
the long awaited Communication of the European Commission in September 2011 here espe-
cially the proposal for a Decision setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of 
energy is a promising step in the right direction.
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FSR Energy Encyclopedia
The following links will give you access a body of knowledge on EU energy regulation and 
policy by Florence School of Regulation. The FSR Energy Encyclopedia is organized around 
50 topics providing short definitions and  giving access to more than 500  publications and 
media files produced or edited by the Florence School of Regulation.
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